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lation and development that characterize the region, water 
quality could have gotten even worse .5 Even so, substantial 
improvement is what the partners promised and unquestion-
ably did not achieve .6
The CBP has twice missed ambitious, but self-imposed 
goals to (1) reduce nutrient loading in the Bay by forty per-
cent no later than the year 20007 and (2) remove the Bay 
from EPA’s national list of waters impaired to the point that 
they can no longer support their designated uses (e .g ., drink-
ing, swimming, fishing, or boating) .8 These failures may have 
embarrassed political leaders for a news cycle or two, but not 
to the point that they seriously considered overhauling their 
partnership in the CBP .9 Only when a blistering report by 
the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) motivated 
actual cuts in CBP funding did the states in the partnership 
confront EPA’s determination to hold them accountable for 
reducing pollution .10
Slowly but surely, though, reform and revitalization are 
becoming manifest . In May 2009, President Obama issued 
Executive Order 13,508 on Chesapeake Bay Protection and 
5 . Steinzor & Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 2, at 1 .
6 . Id.
7 . See Cynthia J . Aukerman, Agricultural Diffuse Pollution Controls: Lessons for 
Scotland From the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, 20 J . Land Use & Envtl . L . 191, 
247 (2004) (describing the revision of the forty percent goal); see also Karl 
Blankenship, Review Warns 40% Goal Won’t Be Enough, Chesapeake Bay J ., 
Dec . 1997, available at http://www .bayjournal .com/article/review_warns_40_
goal_will_not_be_enough (“After a yearlong review, the Bay Program has con-
cluded that its decade-old goal of reducing the amount of nutrients entering 
the Chesapeake 40 percent by the year 2000 won’t happen unless control ef-
forts are accelerated .”) .
8 . See Chesapeake Bay Found ., Restoring Clean Water and the Chesa-
peake Bay 17 (2008), available at www .cbf .org/document .doc?id=53 (“It is 
now clear that, although the partners have made significant commitments, we 
will finish 2010 far from the achievement of the necessary pollution reduction 
goals .”) . The requirements for the impaired waters list are in section 303(d) of 
the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U .S .C . § 1313(d) (2006) .
9 . See Steinzor & Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 2, 
at 4 .
10 . U .S . Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-06-96, Chesapeake Bay Pro-
gram: Improved Strategies Are Needed to Better Assess, Report, and 
Manage Restoration Progress 5 (2005) [hereinafter GAO 2005 Report], 
available at http://www .gao .gov/new .items/d0696 .pdf .
No multi-billion dollar initiative better illustrates the pitfalls of “collaborative partnerships”1 than the Chesapeake Bay Program (“CBP” or “Bay Pro-
gram”), a three-decade long effort that has achieved lim-
ited success in restoring highly degraded water quality in 
the world’s second largest estuary .2 This uneasy alliance of 
six Bay states3 and the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) has cost approximately four billion dollars, 
primarily in federal funds, but has, at best, achieved stasis 
in a watershed plagued by excessive nutrient loading and 
expanding dead zones .4 Given the large increases in popu-
1 . The CBP describes itself as a “collaborative multi-state and federal partner-
ship .” Robert Koroncai et al ., Setting and Allocating the Chesapeake 
Bay Basin Nutrient and Sediment Loads: The Collaborative Process, 
Technical Tools and Innovative Approaches 1 (2003), available at http://
www .chesapeakebay .net/content/publications/cbp_19713 .pdf (“The 1983 
Chesapeake Bay Agreement set the stage for the collaborative multi-state and 
federal partnership .”) .
2 . Rena Steinzor & Shana Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program: 
Exchanging Promises for Results 1 (Ctr . for Progressive Reform, White Paper 
No . 903, June 2009), available at http://www .progressivereform .org/articles/
chesbayfinal .pdf; see also Chesapeake Bay, U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, http://
omp .gso .uri .edu/ompweb/doee/science/descript/bayches .htm (describing the 
geography and geology of the Chesapeake Bay watershed) (last visited Dec . 16, 
2012) .
3 . The Bay states include Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, although Maryland, Pennsylvania, and 
Virginia are by far the dominant partners . See The Chesapeake Bay Watershed, 
Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www .chesapeakebay .net/discover/baywa-
tershed (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
4 . U .S . Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-08-1131R, Recent Actions 
by the Chesapeake Bay Program Are Positive Steps Toward More Ef-
fectively Guiding the Restoration Effort, but Additional Steps Are 
Needed 13 (2008) [hereinafter GAO, Recent Actions] (reporting $3 .7 bil-
lion in direct funding from 1995 to 2004, as well as $1 .9 billion in additional 
indirect funding) .
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Restoration,11 declaring the Bay a national treasure and sig-
naling that EPA will play a strong role in leading Bay res-
toration .12 The order marked a dramatic departure from 
EPA’s traditional, hands-off posture, offering the promise of 
real federal leadership on Bay restoration .13 It required EPA 
to “examine how to make full use of its authorities under 
the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) to protect and restore the 
Chesapeake Bay and its tributary waters” and to establish 
an “independent evaluator” to “strengthen accountability” 
and report periodically on progress made toward meeting 
Bay-wide goals .14
In 2011, EPA announced a mandatory Total Maximum 
Daily Load (“TMDL”) for the Bay .15 This “pollution 
diet” includes ninety-two different limits for impaired 
water quality segments .16 If it stays the course of compel-
ling the states to fulfill their commitments to write per-
mits that reduce pollutant loading to the limits set in the 
TMDL, water quality in the Bay should improve steadily . 
Yet, EPA has encountered gale-force political resistance 
by congressional opponents of regulation and recalci-
trant state and local politicians .17 Its ability to combat 
the same dynamics that sabotaged past restoration efforts 
is not yet clear .18
For example, despite the Executive Order’s call for the cre-
ation of an independent evaluator for the Bay Program, the 
Bay states demurred .19 Instead of establishing a permanent 
and independent entity that would verify the implementa-
tion of federal and state programs on the ground, they opted 
for one-time funding to have the National Research Council 
(“NRC”) of the National Academy of Sciences conduct yet 
another analysis of environmental conditions in the Bay and 
11 . Exec . Order No . 13,508, 74 Fed . Reg . 23099, 23099 (May 15, 2009) .
12 . Id.
13 . Id.
14 . Id. § 206, 74 Fed . Reg . at 23101 .
15 . Clean Water Act § 303(d): Notice for the Establishment of the Total Maxi-
mum Daily Load (“TMDL”) for the Chesapeake Bay, 76 Fed . Reg . 549, 
549–50 (Jan . 5, 2011) . Controlling traditional “point sources” of pollution 
by requiring them to meet technology-based permit requirements is only the 
first step under the Clean Water Act’s regulatory scheme . CWA §§ 301–09, 
33 U .S .C . §§ 1311-19 (2006) . Under section 303(d) of the CWA, if point 
source controls are implemented but water quality standards nevertheless re-
main unmet, states must take a second step: they must define the total amount 
of specific pollution a waterbody can take (the TMDL) and then distribute the 
pollution loadings among point source dischargers and nonpoint and natural 
sources . CWA § 303, 33 U .S .C . § 1313(d) (2006) . States must then work to 
meet the new TMDL limits, which usually requires point sources to face more 
stringent permit requirements and raises the possibility for increased state 
regulation of nonpoint sources . Id.; see also Oliver A . Houck, The Clean 
Water Act TMDL Program: Law, Policy, and Implementation 140 (2d 
ed . 2002) (describing the policy history of EPA’s efforts to fulfill its obligations 
to implement the TMDL provisions of the CWA) .
16 . Clean Water Act § 303(d), 76 Fed . Reg . at 549 .
17 . Doug Siglin, Change You Must Believe In, Chesapeake Bay Ac-
tion Plan (Jan . 10, 2012), http://www .bayactionplan .com/2012/01/
change-you-must-believe-in/ .
18 . Am . Farm Bureau Fed’n v . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, 559 F .3d 512, 536–39 
(D .C . Cir . 2009) .
19 . Chesapeake Bay Program, Independent Evaluator: Key Challenges 14 (Nov . 
1, 2011) (unpublished draft report), available at http://archive .chesapeakebay .
net/pubs/calendar/34450_11-01-11_Report_1_11574 .pdf; see also Steinzor & 
Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 2, at 3 (urging 
adoption of an Independent Evaluator function for the first time) .
the CBP’s past shortcomings .20 Among other findings, the 
NRC committee admitted that it “was unable to determine 
the reliability and accuracy of the [restoration] data reported 
by Bay jurisdictions,” and recommended that “independent 
(third-party) auditing of the tracking and accounting at state 
and local levels would be necessary to ensure the reliability 
and accuracy of the data reported .”21 As this Article goes to 
press, CBP officials have arrived once again at a crossroads, 
wavering between evaluating themselves by setting up inter-
nal “action teams” and establishing the truly independent 
evaluator called for in the Executive Order and recom-
mended by the NRC .22
An independent entity to monitor the performance of 
the CBP and to hold EPA and the states accountable for 
their efforts to reduce nutrient loading in the Bay is sorely 
needed . Despite their public posture of collaboration, states 
participate in the CBP primarily to protect their own inter-
ests and prevent the group from agreeing to restoration or 
pollution prevention programs that would cost too much 
money or anger crucial constituent groups .23 Rather than 
take the Bay states at their word that promised programs are 
adequately funded and—even more important—are being 
implemented effectively, we urge the CBP to create an entity 
with the mission of ground-truthing such claims .24 The inde-
pendent evaluator must have adequate resources not only to 
conduct paper and interview-based audits, but also to spot-
check state compliance by actually visiting the places where 
states claim that cover crops to prevent runoff were planted 
or tertiary sewage treatment was installed .25 This entity 
20 . Chartered by Congress in 1863, the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) is 
a private and nonprofit society of distinguished scholars who advise the federal 
government on scientific and technical matters . Who We Are, Nat’l Acad . of 
Scis ., http://www .nationalacademies .org/about/whoweare/index .html (last vis-
ited Dec . 16, 2012) . Organized by the NAS in 1916, the National Research 
Council (“NRC”) is the operating agency for NAS, consisting of a staff that 
enlists, organizes, and supports experts from around the nation—who are un-
paid for their service on NAS study committees—to issue studies and reports 
upon request . Nat’l Academies, Working With the National Academies: 
A Guide for Prospective Study Sponsors (n .d .), available at http://dels .nas .
edu/resources/static-assets/exec-office-other/sponsor_brochure .pdf . In 2009, 
EPA requested the NRC to “evaluate and provide advice on the CBP nutrient 
reduction program and strategy, [specifically directing] the NRC to evaluate the 
tracking of best management practice implementation, tracking and account-
ing efforts, the two-year milestone strategy, and the states’ and federal agencies’ 
adaptive management strategies, and to suggest improvements to these strate-
gies that might better attain the CBP goals .” Nat’l Research Council, Nat’l 
Acad . of Scis ., Achieving Nutrient and Sediment Reduction Goals in 
the Chesapeake Bay: An Evaluation of Program Strategies and Imple-
mentation viii (2011) [hereinafter NAS/NRC Committee Report], available 
at www .nap .edu/catalog .php?record_id=13131 .
21 . NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 4 .
22 . Chesapeake Bay Program, Independent Evaluator, supra note 19, at 12; Min-
utes from Chesapeake Bay Program Principals’ Staff Comm . Meeting (Feb . 
16, 2012), available at http://www .chesapeakebay .net/channel_files/17880/
(attachment_i .a)_psc_actions_and_decisions_2-16-12_revised_4-19-12 .docx .
23 . As part of our work for the Center for Progressive Reform, we were among the 
first to advocate for the independent evaluator function as a crucial element of 
EPA’s then nascent effort to enforce the Bay-wide TMDL . See, e.g., Steinzor & 
Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 2, at 3 (urging the 
implementation of an independent audit function for the first time) .
24 . Id.
25 . Memorandum from Shana Jones, Senior Policy Analyst, Ctr . for Progressive 
Reform, & Rena Steinzor, Pres ., Ctr . for Progressive Reform, to the Principals’ 
Staff Comm . 1–9 (Sept . 3, 2008), available at http://www .progressivereform .
org/articles/Bay_Accountability_Office_Options_Memo .pdf .
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should consist of a senior person of impeccable integrity and 
a small staff .26 To ensure its independence, the office should 
also report directly to the CBP Executive Council .27
This Article opens with an analysis of why the CBP will 
repeat its past failures unless a reliable mechanism for ensur-
ing accountability is created . It then explains how the inde-
pendent evaluator should be constructed to make possible 
the overall success of Bay restoration . Finally, it closes with 
a rebuttal of the arguments in favor of self-auditing and 
against independent review .
I. Why Collaboration as Usual Means 
Collaborating to Nowhere
The Chesapeake Bay is a poster child both for the wicked 
problem of multi-jurisdictional pollution28 and for our 
nation’s historic failure of political will to regulate agricul-
ture and tackle land use .29 Most of the Chesapeake Bay and 
its tidal waters are listed as impaired under the CWA because 
of excess nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment pollution,30 
also known as nutrient pollution .31 Nutrients “cause algae 
blooms that consume oxygen and create ‘dead zones’” in 
the Bay that choke fish and shellfish and destroy underwater 
grasses and aquatic life .32 Agriculture is the largest source of 
nutrient pollution in the Bay, followed by runoff from urban 
and suburban development .33 Agricultural runoff controls 
are inconsistent across the watershed, unfortunately, as it is 
largely exempted under the CWA .34
The CBP incontestably faces a daunting task: it must 
restore the second largest estuary35 in the world despite the 
fact that almost half of the pollution plaguing the Bay is gen-
erated by unregulated, nonpoint sources located in multiple 
jurisdictions .36 The CBP has unquestionably failed to accom-
plish the maximum pollution reductions achievable under 
its existing legal authority, however, and it has never been 
forthcoming about the increasingly urgent need to draw 
agriculture within the scope of the CWA’s jurisdiction . The 
following discussion will analyze why the CBP has failed to 
make significant progress, explaining how the partnership’s 
failures reveal the dysfunction that inevitably arises when an 
institution’s design—in this case, a “collaborative partner-
26 . Id.
27 . Id.
28 . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, Chesapeake Bay TMDL Executive Summary 
ES-7 (2010), available at http://www .epa .gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/
FinalBayTMDL/BayTMDLExecutiveSummaryFINAL122910_final .pdf .
29 . Jeffrey M . Gaba, New Sources, New Growth, and the Clean Water Act, 55 Ala . 
L . Rev . 651, 652 & n .12, 662 (2004) .
30 . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, Chesapeake Bay TMDL, supra note 28, at ES-3 .
31 . Nutrients, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www .chesapeakebay .net/issues/
issue/nutrients#inline (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
32 . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, Chesapeake Bay TMDL, supra note 28, at ES-3 .
33 . Id.
34 . CWA § 502(14), 33 U .S .C . § 1362(14) (2006) (exempting agricultural storm-
water from definition of “point source”); see also Pew Env’t Grp ., Big Chick-
en: Pollution and Industrial Poultry Production in America 17–18 
(2011) [hereinafter Big Chicken], available at www .pewenvironment .org/
uploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/PEG_BigChicken_July2011 .pdf; 
Gaba, supra note 29, at 652, 662 .
35 . Chesapeake Bay, supra note 2 .
36 . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, Chesapeake Bay TMDL, supra note 28, at ES-7 .
ship” with voluntary, non-binding goals—cannot cope with 
the jurisdictional, environmental, and stakeholder dynamics 
that necessitated action in the first place .37
One threshold reason for the CBP’s shortcomings is 
almost painfully obvious, although no one engaged in “col-
laborating to nowhere” dares to state it clearly in public: the 
states vary widely in their commitments to Bay restoration 
or, to use a common colloquialism, the level of “skin in the 
game” they each have chosen to muster . One of the three 
most important players in the CBP—Pennsylvania—has 
far less incentive to participate affirmatively in a voluntary 
restoration effort than the two other key players, Maryland 
and Virginia .38 Equally troubling, although Maryland and 
Virginia bemoan Pennsylvania’s inaction, they also find 
Pennsylvania a convenient scapegoat and plausible cover for 
their own lack of progress, delaying the hard choices they 
must also make if the Bay is to be restored .39 As we describe 
in more detail below, the symptoms of this mismatch 
include diminished accountability, an increasingly opaque 
and complicated bureaucracy, a penchant for “lowest com-
mon denominator solutions,” and a lack of focus on coming 
clean about whether the states and EPA are doing enough 
to achieve measurable results .40 Unless reversed, the implica-
tion of these dynamics is no less than the slow but inexorable 
death of the Chesapeake Bay’s ecology .
A.	 Causation:	Different	Jurisdictions,	Different	Stakes,	
and	Unregulated	Agriculture
Anyone who negotiates for a living learns a threshold les-
son very quickly: unless the parties share an approximately 
equal stake in resolving their problems voluntarily, talks are 
unlikely to prove productive . Of course, the parties’ inepti-
tude can scuttle settlement even when it is clearly in every-
one’s interests . The most gifted negotiators in the world 
cannot achieve resolution when at least one party is convinced 
that his alternative to agreement is preferable . As this Article 
will show, this basic fact underlies why the CBP’s coopera-
tive partnership has repeatedly missed its own deadlines for 
37 . See infra Part I .A .
38 . See infra Part I .A; Ocean Studies Bd . & Water Sci . & Tech . Bd ., Nat’l Re-
search Council, Clean Coastal Waters: Understanding and Reducing 
the Effects of Nutrient Pollution 2 (2000), available at http://www .nap .
edu/openbook .php?isbn=0309069483 (explaining that while nutrient pollu-
tion harms the Susquehanna’s water quality, it causes less damage as it passes 
through the fast-moving and deep river than when it reaches the Bay’s warm, 
shallow, and slow-moving estuary); Maps, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://
www .chesapeakebay .net/maps (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) (showing that the 
Chesapeake Bay is bordered by the states of Maryland and Virginia but is only 
connected to Pennsylvania by means of the Susquehanna River) .
39 . Darryl Fears, Alarming “Dead Zone’”Grows in the Chesapeake, Wash . Post 
(July 24, 2011), http://www .washingtonpost .com/national/health-science/
alarming-dead-zone-grows-in-thechesapeake/%202011/07/20/gIQABRm-
KXI_story .html (“Especially heavy flows of tainted water from the Susque-
hanna River brought as much nutrient pollution into the bay by May as nor-
mally comes in an entire average year, a Maryland Department of Natural 
Resources researcher said .”) .
40 . See Rena Steinzor & Shana Jones, An Accountability Mechanism for the Chesa-
peake Bay: Interview Findings 2–3, 5–7 (Ctr . for Progressive Reform, White 
Paper No . 808, 2008), available at http://www .progressivereform .org/articles/
Chesapeake_Bay_808 .pdf .
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water quality improvement .41 The states participating in the 
program simply do not have anything close to an equal stake 
in Bay restoration because of how the jurisdictional lines fall 
and how nutrient pollution works .42
The geography of the CPB’s three most important play-
ers—Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania—means that 
each state has remarkably different incentives to participate 
in restoration .43 The Chesapeake Bay is bordered by the states 
of Maryland and Virginia, but is only connected to Penn-
sylvania by means of the Susquehanna River .44 The Susque-
hanna River, which drains into the Bay at Conowingo, 
Maryland, is located almost entirely in the state of Pennsyl-
vania, although its headwaters are in New York .45 It provides 
fifty percent of the Bay’s freshwater because the Bay is the 
“ria” of the Susquehanna—in essence, a drowned river valley 
that formed into an estuary .46
Unfortunately, the Susquehanna is not only the Bay’s 
most important freshwater source, but due to agricultural 
pollution, it is also the leading contributor to the Bay’s 
demise .47 The river delivers almost half of the nitrogen pol-
lution loads to the Bay (forty-four percent) .48 In contrast, 
Virginia and Maryland, combined, deliver roughly the same 
amount, at twenty-seven percent and twenty percent respec-
tively .49 The largest dead zone in Bay history, covering one-
third of the watershed during the summer and fall of 2011, 
was blamed on nutrient run-off from Pennsylvania’s Susque-
hanna River .50
Taking a geographic, economic, and perhaps even envi-
ronmental point of view, Pennsylvania’s regressive behavior 
in the absence of strong federal leadership becomes more 
understandable .51 Although nutrient pollution certainly 
harms the Susquehanna’s water quality, it causes less dam-
age as it passes through the fast-moving and deep river than 
when it reaches the Bay’s warm, shallow, and slow-moving 
estuary .52 Dead zones do not plague the Susquehanna like 
41 . See supra notes 1–10 .
42 . See supra notes 37–38 .
43 . See supra note 38 .
44 . See Maps, supra note 38 .
45 . The Susquehanna River, Susquehanna River Valley Visitors Bureau, http://
www .visitcentralpa .org/page .asp?tid=135&name=The-Susquehanna-Riv-
er (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
46 . Captain John Smith Chesapeake National Historic Trail: The Chesapeake Forma-
tion, U .S . Nat’l Park Serv ., http://www .smithtrail .net/the-chesapeake/forma-
tion/ (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
47 . See supra notes 25–27 .
48 . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, Sources of Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Sedi-
ment to the Chesapeake Bay 4-2 (2010), available at http://www .epa .gov/
reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/FinalBayTMDL/CBayFinalTMDLSection4 
_final .pdf .
49 . Id. at 4-1 . At forty-three percent, Virginia dominates phosphorus loads to the 
Bay . Id. 4-2 . Pennsylvania and Maryland follow at twenty-four percent and 
twenty percent, respectively . Id. Sediment loading estimates are similar, with 
Virginia at forty-one percent, Pennsylvania at thirty-two percent, and Mary-
land at seventeen percent . Id.
50 . Fears, supra note 39 (“Especially heavy flows of tainted water from the Susque-
hanna River brought as much nutrient pollution into the bay by May as nor-
mally comes in an entire average year, a Maryland Department of Natural 
Resources researcher said .”) .
51 . Pollution quickly moved by one state’s river into another state’s bay does not 
end up in the “backyard” of the river state . See Ocean Studies Bd . & Water 
Sci . & Tech . Bd ., supra note 38, at 2 .
52 . Id.
they plague the Bay .53 Further, Pennsylvania does not have 
waterside real estate . The state has no physical or cultural 
connection to the Bay, as opposed to the watershed, nor 
does it receive any real economic benefit from it . In contrast, 
the aesthetic, cultural, and economic values the Bay brings 
to Maryland and Virginia are considerable—the seafood 
industry alone in these states “contributed $3 .39 billion in 
sales, $890 million in income, and almost 34,000 jobs to the 
local economy .”54
To complicate matters even further, only a little more 
than half of the entire state of Pennsylvania falls within the 
Bay watershed .55 This kind of problem, as Professor Brad 
Karkkainen points out, represents severe inconsistencies in 
territorial scale, where environmental pollution does not 
track sovereign boundaries .56 Not only does Pennsylvania as 
a whole get no real benefit from the threatened resource at 
issue—a classic transboundary pollution problem—but only 
half of the state sits within the Bay watershed, diluting the 
political pressure to take action to “save the Bay” when this 
big and, in recent years, economically stressed state must 
decide how to spend diminishing government resources .57 In 
short, we suspect that Pennsylvania—a state that contrib-
utes forty-four percent of the nitrogen, twenty-four percent 
of the phosphorus, and thirty-two percent of the sediment 
pollution that is choking the Bay—has too little incentive 
to cooperate with restoration unless the federal government 
compels it to do so .58 State funding patterns reflect these 
dynamics . In 2010, for example, Pennsylvania spent $166 .7 
million, Maryland spent $256 .6 million, and Virginia spent 
$367 million on Bay restoration .59
The differing stakes that states have in the preservation of 
transboundary natural resources is among the most impor-
tant justifications of federal environmental laws and their 
enforcement by EPA .60 Despite these challenging realities, 
including the pathways of nutrient pollution and the eco-
nomics of the region, federal funding is not provided in 
proportion to Pennsylvania’s role in the problem .61 In 2010, 
Pennsylvania received approximately $10 .5 million in fed-
eral funding for Bay-related efforts, while Maryland received 
$44 .85 million and Virginia received $31 .2 million .62 
Investing limited funds purely on the basis of where federal 
dollars might achieve the biggest bang for the buck might 
well cause Pennsylvania’s share to increase substantially . Of 
53 . Id.
54 . Chesapeake Bay Found ., The Economic Argument for Cleaning up the 
Chesapeake Bay and Its Rivers 5 (2012), available at http://www .cbf .org/
document .doc?id=1094 .
55 . See Maps, supra note 38 .
56 . Bradley C . Karkkainen, Managing Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems: Lessons 
From the Great Lakes, 19 Pac . McGeorge Global Bus . & Dev . L .J . 209, 221 
(2006) .
57 . See id. (describing a prominent example of this dynamic: the Great Lakes) .
58 . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, Sources of Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Sedi-
ment, supra note 48, at 4-2 .
59 . Partner Coordination & Support: Bay Funding, ChesapeakeStat, http://stat .
chesapeakebay .net/?q=node/127&quicktabs_25=2 (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
60 . For a discussion of the factors that motivate environmental federalism, see Rena 
Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the “New (New) Federalism”: 
Devolution, Revolution, or Reform, 81 Minn . L . Rev . 97, 165–75 (1996) .
61 . Id .
62 . Id.
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course, we suspect that Pennsylvania’s own reluctance to 
invest in cleanup is the reason the federal government is 
provoked to lessen its contribution to the state’s programs . 
In any event, until and unless Pennsylvania’s recalcitrance 
is overcome, reaching TMDL targets will remain extraordi-
narily challenging .
Confounding these tensions is the reality that large 
swaths of industrial agriculture remain unregulated under 
the CWA, and Congress appears to lack the wherewithal 
to plug this gaping loophole any time soon .63 Throughout 
the watershed, the agricultural industry is consolidating, 
with the result that animal manure and runoff are increas-
ing as more and more animals are concentrated on small 
lots .64 Over the past fifty years, the number of chickens 
produced annually has increased, the poultry industry has 
industrialized, and huge companies like Perdue, known as 
“integrators,” have concentrated the operations that grow 
their chickens around their large meat processing facilities 
in a relatively small number of Southern states that include 
Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia .65 The result: large-scale 
operations in limited geographic areas creating too much 
manure for the surrounding cropland to absorb .66 This run-
off ends up washing into the local waterways that lead to 
the Bay .67
Pennsylvania’s Lancaster County stands out as a glaring 
example of this unfortunate trend .68 The county’s runoff, 
which drains into the Susquehanna River, is a tiny frac-
tion—1 .5%—of the entire Chesapeake watershed .69 Yet, 
thanks to the twenty-two million cows, pigs, chickens, and 
turkeys located in Lancaster County, it manages to generate 
more nitrogen from manure than any other county in the 
watershed .70 The surrounding fields simply cannot absorb 
the tremendous amount of manure—seventy-two million 
pounds annually—that is produced .71
In the “Delmarva” region, which includes the Eastern 
Shore areas of Delaware, Virginia, and Maryland, efforts by 
any one state to crack down on the largest source of nutri-
ent loading in the Bay—agriculture, including animals and 
crops72—invariably provoke threats that large employers 
like Perdue will simply move their operations a little further 
63 . 40 C .F .R . §  122 .3(e) (2012) (exempting “[a]ny introduction of pollutants 
from non point-source agricultural and silvicultural activities, including storm 
water runoff from orchards, cultivated crops, pastures, range lands, and forest 
lands  .  .  .”) .
64 . Big Chicken, supra note 34, at 1–2 .
65 . Id.
66 . Id. at 8–13 .
67 . Id.
68 . Chesapeake Bay Found ., Waters at Risk: Pollution in the Susque-
hanna Watershed—Sources and Solutions 4 (2006), available at http://
www .cbf .org/document .doc?id=197 (“Lancaster County [is] the second larg-
est producer of agricultural products east of the Mississippi, fifth in livestock 
production nationally, and the largest producer of manure in the Chesapeake 




72 . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, Sources of Nitrogen, Phosphorus and 
Sediment, supra note 48, at 4-29 (“Agriculture is the largest single source 
of nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment loading to the Bay through applying 
fertilizers, tilling croplands, and applying animal manure . Agricultural activi-
ties are responsible for approximately 44 percent of nitrogen and phosphorus 
up the road, into the more welcoming territory of another 
state jurisdiction .73
For much of the past three decades, EPA has confined 
its efforts in the Bay to fielding staff experts to advise state 
members of the CBP in their endless rounds of collaboration 
without using its legal authority to issue and enforce bind-
ing limits on pollution that ruins water quality .74 Without 
strong federal leadership, these disparities among the CBP 
partners doom dialogue among the states to posturing and 
recriminations, especially when the only consequence of that 
behavior may be exactly what some states want: little action 
and more delay .75
President Obama’s election and the appointment of Lisa 
Jackson as EPA Administrator presented landmark oppor-
tunities to change these dynamics .76 In 2009, President 
Obama’s Executive Order on Chesapeake Bay Protection 
and Restoration required EPA to “examine how to make full 
use of its authorities under the Clean Water Act to protect 
and restore the Chesapeake Bay and its tributary waters .”77 
EPA responded in 2011 with the “Bay Total Maximum Daily 
Load” (“Bay TMDL”), which includes new limits for each 
of the ninety-two “impaired water quality segments” flow-
ing into the Bay and constitutes the nation’s first regional 
TMDL .78 The Bay TMDL’s requirements are creating new 
pressures on Bay jurisdictions to achieve increased reductions 
from sewage treatment plants, develop stronger stormwater 
controls, and develop better land use practices to control 
nonpoint source pollution .79 Indeed, the apparent progress 
that has been made in the past two years under the Bay 
TMDL effort stands in stark contrast to the Bay Program’s 
poor track record, suggesting that the Bay TMDL’s structure 
of legal consequences, specific timelines, and the possibility 
loads delivered to the Bay and about 65 percent of sediment loads delivered 
to the Bay .”) .
73 . See Paul E . Gutermann & David H . Quigley, Drowning in a Sea of Clean 
Water Act Regulation 3–4 (2000), available at http://www .akingump .
com/files/Publication/ecb32f29-436c-49b0-9cfa-026798edadf2/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/34189918-0cab-496f-b712-074f8be389d4/99 .pdf 
(exemplifying the kind of analysis that implies that strengthening environmen-
tal controls on farmers will cause the industry to move elsewhere) .
74 . The Reasonable Assurance letter for the TMDL shows how far EPA could have 
gone if it had chosen to do so . See Letter from Donald S . Welsh, Reg’l Adm’r, 
U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, to John Griffin, Sec’y, Md . Dep’t of Natural Res . 
(Sept . 11, 2008), available at http://www .epa .gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/
EPARegionIIIlettertoPSC091108 .pdf .
75 . See Howard R . Ernst, Fight for the Bay: Why a Dark Green Environ-
mental Awakening Is Needed to Save the Chesapeake Bay 12–14 (2009) .
76 . See Press Release, U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, EPA Administrator Lisa P . Jack-
son Testimony Before the U .S . Senate, Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies (May 
16, 2012), available at http://yosemite .epa .gov/opa/admpress .nsf/d0c-
f6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/b8c60367c90d9e7d85257a00005596c2!
opendocument (requesting more funding for protecting the Chesapeake Bay); 
About Administrator Lisa Jackson, U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, http://www .epa .
gov/aboutepa/administrator .html (last updated Dec . 10, 2012); see also Exec . 
Order No . 13,508, 74 Fed . Reg . 23099, 23100 (May 15, 2009) (setting goals 
for the federal government’s role in Chesapeake Bay restoration) .
77 . Exec . Order No . 13,508, 74 Fed . Reg . at 23101 .
78 . Clean Water Act § 303(d): Notice for the Establishment of the Total Maxi-
mum Daily Load (TMDL) for the Chesapeake Bay, 76 Fed . Reg . 549, 549–50 
(Jan . 5, 2011) .
79 . Id.
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of rulemaking and denial of funding may create results in a 
way that a “collaborative partnership” simply cannot .80
B.	 Symptomatology:	Institutional	Design	Mismatch
An understanding of the cumulative impact of the institu-
tional problems that plague Bay restoration efforts requires 
a more detailed evaluation of how the CBP partnership 
evolved . The CBP is the oldest, voluntary, watershed man-
agement program in the country and has been hailed by 
some “new governance” scholars as an example of how post-
regulatory, collaborative approaches can work .81 We do not 
quarrel with the underlying imperative of holistic, watershed 
management that is implied in such rosy characterizations 
of the CBP .82 Rather, we are convinced that a harder look at 
how the CBP works in practice reveals the stark limitations 
of volunteerism that depends on high federal funding levels 
and the tough, practical institutional design changes that are 
now necessary if the CBP is serious about improving how it 
works to restore the Bay .
The CBP is a bureaucracy created by statute,83 as well as 
a creature of agreements made by its federal and state part-
ners—an arrangement that not only dilutes the program’s 
mission, but also creates confusion as to who—EPA? the 
states? the CBP itself?—has final responsibility for honor-
ing the program’s commitments to restoring the Bay .84 The 
CBP got its start in 1983, after a twenty-seven million dol-
lar study sponsored by Senator Charles “Mac” Mathias 
(R-MD .) pinpointed excess nutrient pollution as the cause 
of the Bay’s rapid decline and the first of three “Bay Agree-
ments” was signed .85 Considering the four billion dollar 
effort and bureaucracy that subsequently evolved, the first 
Bay Agreement was modest in scope—a one-page docu-
ment that created the Executive Council,86 a group that con-
sisted of the respective state “cabinet designees” to oversee 
80 . See, e.g., Sustainable Growth and Preservation Act, 2012 Md . Laws 149 (en-
acted) (requiring new regulations for proposed septic systems) . The preamble 
to Act emphasizes how it is designed to respond to the Bay TMDL and support 
Maryland’s efforts to meet its Phase II WIP reductions under the TMDL . Id.
81 . Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and 
Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 Envtl . L . 1239, 1254–
82 (2008) (citing Robert Costanza & Jack Greer, The Chesapeake Bay and Its 
Watershed: A Model for Sustainable Ecosystem Management?, in Barriers and 
Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions 169 (Lance H . 
Gunderson, C .S . Holling & Stephen S . Light eds ., 1995)) . But see Ernst, 
supra note 75, at 10 (calling, provocatively, Bay restoration efforts a “political 
deadzone”) . Ernst aptly describes how the CBP was hobbled at the outset be-
cause it lacked the authority to regulate . Id. at 15 . Ultimately, Ernst diagnoses 
the problem as a being one of “light green environmentalism” and a lack of 
political will, arguing that a “dark green” approach to Bay restoration that isn’t 
afraid of conflict if necessary . Id. at 23 .
82 . For a positive characterization of the partnership, see Jon Cannon, Choices and 
Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 Wm . & Mary Envtl . L . & Pol’y Rev . 
379 (2000) .
83 . CWA § 117(b)(2)(B), 33 U .S .C . § 1267(b)(2)(B) (2006) .
84 . See supra notes 48–60 and accompanying discussion .
85 . Chesapeake Bay Program History, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www .
chesapeakebay .net/about/how/history (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
86 . Chesapeake Bay Program, 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement 1 (Dec . 9, 1983) 
(unpublished agreement), available at http://www .chesapeakebay .net/content/
publications/cbp_12512 .pdf [hereinafter 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement] . 
The signatories included the governors of Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylva-
nia, the mayor of the District of Columbia, and the Administrator of EPA . Id.
the coordination of Bay restoration efforts and to establish 
a “liaison office for Chesapeake Bay activities .”87 Congress 
subsequently incorporated this agreement into the CWA 
when it created the Bay Program in 1983, defining the sig-
natories of the Agreement as the “Executive Council” and 
tasking it with “direct[ing]” the Bay Program .88 Although 
the 1983 Agreement is a short document, it nevertheless 
set the tone for the voluntary culture of the Bay Program 
for decades to come, stating that “a cooperative approach 
is needed   .   .   .  to fully address the extent, complexity, and 
sources of pollutants entering the Bay” and avoiding legally 
binding commitments .89
A second and more robust Bay Agreement followed in 
1987 .90 Significantly, it not only created far more substantive 
and detailed—albeit non-binding—policy goals, including 
an agreement to reduce nitrogen and phosphorus pollution 
by forty percent no later than 2000, but it also changed the 
membership of the Executive Council to replace the cabinet 
secretaries with the governors of the signatory states (Vir-
ginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania) and to include both the 
EPA Administrator and the chair of the Chesapeake Bay 
Commission on the Council .91 In 1992, the 1987 Agreement 
was amended, reaffirming the forty percent reduction goal 
and expanding the CBP’s focus beyond the basin itself by 
emphasizing the importance of addressing nonpoint source 
pollution in the tributaries draining into the Bay .92
The third agreement—Chesapeake 2000 (“C2K”)—
continued in the same direction as the previous two 
agreements, enhancing and emphasizing “the ecosys-
tem management aspects of the Program, at least on 
paper .”93 From “set[ting] a new goal with implementa-
tion schedules for additional migratory and resident fish 
passages that addresses the removal of physical block-
ages” to “establish[ing] harvest targets for the blue crab 
fishery” to “defin[ing] the water quality conditions nec-
essary to protect aquatic living resources,” C2K was a 
87 . Id.
88 . CWA §  117(a)(4)–(5), 33 U .S .C . §  1267(a)(4)–(5) (defining “Chesapeake 
Bay Program” to mean “the program directed by the Chesapeake Executive 
Council in accordance with the Chesapeake Bay Agreement” and defining 
“Chesapeake Executive Council” to mean “the signatories to the Chesapeake 
Bay Agreement .”) .
89 . See 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement, supra note 86, at 1 .
90 . See Chesapeake Bay Program, 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement 1 (Dec . 15, 
1987) [hereinafter 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement] (unpublished agree-
ment), available at http://www .chesapeakebay .net/content/publications/
cbp_12510 .pdf .
91 . Id. at 3, 6 . It also, as Professor Annecoos Wiersema points out, called for a 
type of adaptive management, as it provided that it would “reevalu[ate]” its 
forty percent nitrogen reduction target in four years, “‘based on the results of 
modeling, research, monitoring and other information available at that time .’” 
Wiersema, supra note 81, at 1270 (quoting 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement 
3) (providing a good overview of the history of the CBP) . Ironically, the NRC 
found that “[n]either the EPA nor the Bay jurisdictions exhibit a clear under-
standing of adaptive management and how it might be applied in pursuit of 
water quality goals .” NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 7; see 
infra Part II .E (discussing why adaptive management should not be a substi-
tute for an independent evaluator) .
92 . See Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay Agreement: 1992 Amendments 
1 (Aug . 12, 1992) [hereinafter Chesapeake Bay Agreement: 1992 Amend-
ments] (unpublished agreement), available at http://www .chesapeakebay .net/
content/publications/cbp_12507 .pdf .
93 . Wiersema, supra note 81, at 1271 .
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comprehensive and ambitious document .94 The head-
water states Delaware, New York, and West Virginia,95 
subsequently signed a Memorandum of Understanding, 
agreeing, among other things, to “[w]ork cooperatively 
to achieve the nutrient and sediment reduction targets 
that we agree are necessary to achieve the goals of a clean 
Chesapeake Bay by 2010, thereby allowing the Chesa-
peake and its tidal tributaries to be removed from the list 
of impaired waters .”96
All of this paperwork could look like progress, but it was 
not .97 The Bay simply did not improve . Yet, this history is 
important because it established the institutions that remain 
active to this day . For example, the Executive Council was 
established at the top of the Bay Program’s organizational 
chart, where it remains, according to the CPB’s website, 
“accountable to the public for progress made under the Bay 
agreements .”98 Although the history reveals an increasing 
awareness among the partners of the complexity of the Bay’s 
ecosystem and the technical complexity of restoring it, the 
CBP’s track record also reveals a disturbing trend: the mem-
bers of the Executive Council—predominantly governors 
who serve two terms at best—have been setting goals for 
a program that will come due long after they leave office .99 
This practice allows them to sidestep genuine accountability 
and saddles their successors with the inevitably harsh reac-
tion in the media and among the public when deadlines 
arrive and are not met .100
Moreover, the CBP’s history reveals an increasingly com-
plicated and growing web of voluntary interim goals that 
further confuse accountability . One such agreement gen-
erated more than one hundred non-binding goals that, in 
hindsight, were too broad to direct on-the-ground man-
agement and too vague to reveal who was responsible for 
implementing them .101 The result was an increasingly opaque 
bureaucracy with a continually revolving leadership that was 
bound together only by voluntary goals and sitting on top 
of so many moving parts that no one could properly be held 
accountable .102 Long-time Bay Program participants agree 
94 . Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake 2000, at 3, 6 (June 28, 2000) (unpub-
lished agreement), available at http://www .chesapeakebay .net/content/publi-
cations/cbp_12081 .pdf .
95 . Id. at 12 . The governors of New York and Delaware committed to Chesa-
peake 2000’s water quality goals through a memorandum of understanding 
signed in 2000 . Memorandum of Understanding Among the State of Del . et 
al . 2 (2002), available at http://www .chesapeakebay .net/content/publications/
cbp_12085 .pdf . The governor of West Virginia added his signature in 2002 . 
Id.
96 . Id. at 1 .
97 . See, supra, notes 1–10.
98 . Chesapeake Executive Council, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www .chesa-
peakebay .net/groups/group/chesapeake_executive_council (last visited Dec . 
16, 2012) .
99 . Lisa M . Ochsenhirt et al ., Restoration of the Chesapeake Bay, 60 Va . Law . 45, 45 
(2011) (discussing a thirteen-year program) .
100 . Id. at 46 (showing the repercussions from a 1987 initiative that could not be 
fulfilled beginning in 2007) .
101 . See Steinzor & Jones, An Accountability Mechanism, supra note 40, at 5–9 .
102 . Partnerships, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www .chesapeakebay .net/
about/how/partnerships (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) (“The Bay Program part-
nership includes: 19 federal agencies; Nearly 40 state agencies and programs 
in Delaware, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia and 
the District of Columbia; approximately 1,800 local governments, represented 
through the Local Government Advisory Committee; More than 20 academic 
that the CBP’s “slow-moving collaborative structure” is its 
greatest weakness, resulting in “‘lowest common denomi-
nator solutions’ and a lack of focus instead of increased 
accountability for progress .”103
Although the Executive Council meets annually and 
always takes a moment for a photo-op,104 much of the sub-
stantive decision-making and agenda-setting is delegated 
to the Principals’ Staff Committee (“PSC”), which is one 
“layer” down in the CBP hierarchy and one-step removed 
from overt press and public scrutiny .105 The PSC primarily 
consists of high-level, career environmental regulators and 
resource managers representing various federal and state 
agencies—the U .S . Fish and Wildlife Service, EPA Region 
III, the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and 
Natural Resources, the Virginia Department of Agriculture 
and Forestry, and the Maryland Department of the Envi-
ronment—just to name a few .106 The PSC once oversaw the 
CBP’s Implementation Committee, but after a recent reorga-
nization, it now oversees the Management Board .107
The members of the PSC are clearly some of the most 
capable experts in their respective policy arenas, but their 
loyalties rest not with the CBP but with the state, agency, 
and/or constituency they represent .108 The PSC is designed, 
in large part, to ensure that each state’s concerns are rep-
resented and that the states are not pushed outside their 
comfort zones .109 Despite their well-advertised and cheer-
fully optimistic pledges of fealty to a collaborative partner-
ship, state government officials who participate in the CBP 
must ensure in the first instance that their own state’s inter-
ests are well-guarded .110 Highly suspicious of each other’s 
efforts to advertise often meager accomplishments, their 
institutions, represented through the Scientific and Technical Advisory Com-
mittee; More than 60 non-governmental organizations, including businesses, 
non-profits and advocacy groups”) .
103 . Steinzor & Jones, An Accountability Mechanism, supra note 40, at 3 .
104 . See, e.g., Press Release, Chesapeake Bay Program, New Course Charted for 
Chesapeake Bay’s Recovery (May 12, 2009), available at http://www .chesa-
peakebay .net/presscenter/release/new_course_charted_for_the_chesapeake_
bays_recovery (touting the results of a meeting of the Executive Council); 
Stormwater Utility Participates in Chesapeake Bay Meeting, City of Richmond 
Dep’t of Pub . Utils . (2011), http://www .richmondgov .com/PublicUtilities/
documents/CheaspBayExecMeeting11July11 .pdf (touting the participation of 
the city of Richmond in Program activities); Kate Yanchulis, Governors Calls 
for Cooperation in Chesapeake Bay Cleanup, News 21 (June 4, 2010), http://
chesapeake .news21 .com/blog/index .php/2010/06/04/governors-call-for-
cooperation-in-chesapeake-bay-cleanup/ (touting the commitment of various 
Bay state governors to the collaborative approach) .
105 . Principals’ Staff Committee: Scope and Purpose, Chesapeake Bay Program, 
http://www .chesapeakebay .net/groups/group/principals_staff_committee (last 
visited Dec . 16, 2012) (stating that the PSC “acts as the policy advisors to the 
Executive Council, accepting items for Council consideration and approval, 
and setting agendas for Council meetings”) .
106 . Id.
107 . Chesapeake Bay Program, Reorganization Proposal 5 (2008), avail-
able at http://archive .chesapeakebay .net/pubs/calendar/PSC_09-22-08_
Handout_7_9784 .pdf (stating that the Management Board replaced the Im-
plementation Committee); How We’re Organized, Chesapeake Bay Program, 
http://www .chesapeakebay .net/about/organized (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
108 . See Principals’ Staff Committee: Scope and Purpose, supra note 105 (“Individual 
members of the PSC arrange and provide briefings to their principals, the 
Agreement signatories .”) .
109 . See Steinzor & Jones, An Accountability Mechanism, supra note 40, at 5 (de-
scribing interviewees stating that the Program is “captured by the states”) .
110 . See supra notes 22–42 and accompanying text (discussing problems resulting 
from conflicting interests of different states) .
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strategies are defensive to the core, with each state delega-
tion working to prevent the group from endorsing a joint 
action or activity that would cast it in an negative light or 
cost it too much money .111
When we interviewed long-time Bay Program partici-
pants about improving the accountability of the CBP, they 
agreed that an independent mechanism was needed: “It is 
very disconcerting to hear that the Program or PSC will be 
deciding what should be evaluated,” one interviewee stat-
ed .112 “We need complete independence on that .   .   .   . This 
needs to be an outside group completely . It needs to be out of 
the hands of the operatives .”113 “We achieve independence,” 
another interviewee said, “by picking someone out of the 
Program . Somebody without an agenda, who is capable of 
understanding the issues and challenges, and evaluating 
them in an objective way .”114
At the staff—as opposed to the political appointee—level, 
the CBP is a beehive of activity that involves literally dozens 
of committees, subcommittees, working groups, taskforces, 
teams, and advisory groups devoted to endless discussions 
of who did what to whom yesterday, the day before, and 
ten years ago .115 Such an unwieldy bureaucracy not only 
obfuscates restoration efforts for the general public, but it 
also strains limited staff resources for the agencies and orga-
nizations that participate .116 We do not wish to imply that 
this work does not accomplish some meaningful results . 
Environmental conditions in the Bay are extraordinarily 
well-characterized .117 Research, field testing, and the publi-
cation of an endless stream of beautiful reports demonstrate 
strong understanding and analysis of the environmental 
problems—from declining submerged aquatic vegetation to 
decimated oyster populations—plaguing the Bay .118 But all 
of this study has not translated into anything near the level 
of action required to reverse the Bay’s decline .119 In our view, 
the paradox between intense analysis and meager results 
suggests a basic insight to all proponents of ecosystem man-
agement, adaptive management, and other “new” or “col-
laborative” forms of governance: describing the science is not 
enough . Assessing institutional accountability needs a differ-
111 . See supra notes 22–42 and accompanying text .
112 . See Steinzor & Jones, An Accountability Mechanism, supra note 40, at 13 .
113 . Id.
114 . Id.
115 . Wiersema, supra note 81, at 1272 (“The Program is renowned for being com-
plex in the sense that the relationship among committees and subcommittees 
is not always a straightforward hierarchy . Even those who have devoted large 
portions of their careers to the Bay Program’s work and have been involved 
with it from its inception do not shy away from recognizing that the Program 
is extremely complex in design and practice .”) .
116 . Steinzor & Jones, An Accountability Mechanism, supra note 40, at 6 (explain-
ing how more than one interviewee from a headwater state “mentioned how 
difficult it was to dedicate the staff necessary to participate fully in the various 
committees and working groups”) .
117 . The History of Chesapeake Bay Cleanup Efforts, Chesapeake Bay Found ., 
http://www .cbf .org/how-we-save-the-bay/chesapeake-clean-water-blueprint/
history-of-bay-cleanup-efforts (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) (“The Chesapeake 
Bay is arguably the most studied large body of water on earth . It is an unusu-
ally complex ecosystem, but there is a great deal of scientific consensus on the 
causes of its decline .”) .
118 . Publications: Reports, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www .chesapeakebay .net/
publications/categories/category/report (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
119 . Steinzor & Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 2, at 1 .
ent kind of metric, or measurement, of progress . To succeed, 
oversight requires the CBP and its partners to go one cru-
cial step further, to the point of identifying what actions are 
needed to improve those conditions and which entities will 
be held responsible for undertaking that work .120 Taking this 
step, however, would force states to address nonpoint source 
pollution—something they have been loath to do because 
agricultural interests are adamantly opposed to regulation 
and are politically powerful . That crucial progression will 
not happen under the existing institutional structure .
II. The Bubble Bursts: Damning Reports, 
Bad Press, Reshuffling the Deck
The CBP’s bubble of collaboration—touted for years by 
opportunistic politicians, anxiety-ridden bureaucrats, and 
regulation-averse academics—burst in 2005 when GAO 
harshly criticized the CBP’s information collection and 
reporting methods .121 It found that various data had been 
so “commingled” that “the public cannot easily determine 
whether the health of the [B]ay is improving or not .”122 
Worse, GAO concluded that the CBP deliberately perpetu-
ated such confusion by downplaying negative trends and 
painting a “rosier picture of the bay’s health” than was war-
ranted .123 The GAO’s report so incensed Senator Barbara 
Mikulski (D-MD) that she engineered the withholding of 
five million dollars from the CBP until it implemented the 
GAO’s recommendations for improvement .124 The amount 
was relatively small, but the message that business as usual 
could not continue was at last communicated .
In 2007, the CBP annual update, titled A Report to the 
Citizens of the Bay Region, Chesapeake Bay Health & Resto-
ration Assessment, dramatized both the CBP’s long-standing 
hesitancy to speak plainly about the lack of progress being 
made by its state partners and the pressures it was under to be 
clearer .125 The report contained close to forty pages of lavish 
graphics, photographs, and text .126 It acknowledged that the 
Bay was in trouble, but did not explain which specific insti-
120 . See infra note 193 (discussing metrics) .
121 . GAO 2005 Report, supra note 10, at 4–5 . The accuracy of the Bay Program’s 
numbers had been questioned by Bay advocates and reporters prior to the 
GAO report . See, e.g., Peter Whoriskey, Bay Pollution Progress Overstated; Gov-
ernment Program’s Computer Model Proved Too Optimistic, Wash . Post, July 
18, 2004, at A1 (comparing the Bay Program’s computer model with U .S . 
Geological Survey water monitoring data) .
122 . GAO 2005 Report, supra note 10, at Highlights .
123 . Id.
124 . Karl Blankenship, Action Plan Will Coordinate; Review Bay Cleanup Goals, 
Chesapeake Bay J ., Sept . 2008, available at http://www .bayjournal .com/ar-
ticle/action_plan_will_coordinate_review_bay_cleanup_goals . At a congres-
sional hearing held on July 30, 2008, GAO testified that they did not think 
the Bay Program has met the objective of establishing an “independent and 
objective reporting process .” U .S . Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-08-
1033T, Chesapeake Bay Program: Recent Actions Are Positive Steps To-
ward More Effectively Guiding the Restoration Effort 9 (2008), avail-
able at http://www .gpo .gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-08-1033T/pdf/
GAOREPORTS-GAO-08-1033T .pdf .
125 . Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay 2007 Health and Restora-
tion Assessment 6 (2007), available at http://www .chesapeakebay .net/docu-
ments/cbp_26038 .pdf .
126 . Id. at 1–33 .
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tutions are responsible for addressing the worst problems .127 
Instead, on page six, the authors tucked in the following 
throw-away line: “Program scientists project that little more 
than half of the pollution reduction efforts needed to achieve 
the nutrient goals have been undertaken since 1985 .”128 This 
remarkable admission suggested what many knew: the rea-
son the Bay’s conditions continue to worsen was that the 
CBP partners had not gone nearly far enough in developing 
and implementing concrete regulatory and land use manage-
ment programs that would prevent discharges of nutrients 
into the already polluted water .129
Two 2008 reports by the Office of Inspector General for 
EPA (“IG”) subsequently bolstered GAO’s findings .130 The 
IG advised EPA to tell the hard truth to Congress and the 
public that the Bay Program is “significantly short of its goals” 
and that partners need to make major changes if goals are to 
be met .131 Then, in late 2008, The Washington Post broke a 
front-page story quoting former Program officials saying they 
“tried to conceal for years that their effort was failing—even 
issuing reports overstating their progress—to preserve the 
flow of federal and state money to the project .”132 Jeff Lape, 
CBP’s director at the end of the George W . Bush Adminis-
tration, removed the tagline “The Nation’s Premier Water-
shed Restoration Partnership” from the Program’s website, 
replacing it with “A Watershed Partnership .”133 The poster 
child for dialogue and volunteerism had fallen off its pedes-
tal, and deservedly so .
A.	 Reshuffling	the	Deck:	The	CBP	Responds	to	
Criticisms
As the criticisms and dispiriting facts piled up, CBP part-
ners—and, specifically, the PSC—responded in two crucial 
ways . First, at an October 2007 PSC meeting, the Bay juris-
dictions and EPA agreed that it would establish a multi-state 
127 . Id. at 20–31 .
128 . Id. at 6 .
129 . See, e.g., Office of Inspector Gen ., U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, No . 08-P-
0049, Despite Progress, EPA Needs to Improve Oversight of Wastewa-
ter Upgrades in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, at Introduction, 13–14 
(2008) [hereinafter EPA Needs to Improve Oversight] (emphasis added), 
available at http://www .epa .gov/oig/reports/2008/20080108-08-P-0049 .pdf 
(explaining the challenges of ensuring that wastewater treatment plants are 
upgraded as required by EPA) .
130 . EPA Needs to Improve Oversight, supra note 129; Office of Inspector 
Gen ., U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, No . 08-P-0199, EPA Needs to Better 
Report Chesapeake Bay Challenges 8 (2008), available at http://www .epa .
gov/oig/reports/2008/20080714-08-P-0199 .pdf .
131 . EPA Needs to Improve Oversight, supra note 129, at Introduction, 13–14 
(emphasis added) .
132 . David Fahrenthold, Broken Promises on the Bay, Wash . Post (Dec . 27, 2008), 
http://www .washingtonpost .com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/26/
AR2008122601712 .html . The article quotes William Matuszeski, who di-
rected the Program for ten years, from 1991 to 2001, who “described how the 
program repeatedly released data that exaggerated its success, hoping to influ-
ence Congress .” Id. The article also reports that “[h]is successor, Rebecca W . 
Hanmer, said she was instructed by regional leaders in 2002 not to acknowl-
edge that the effort would fall short of its 2010 goals .” Id.
133 . Ernst, supra note 75, at 18 . The tagline is now “Science, Restoration, and 
Partnership .” See Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://
www .chesapeakebay .net/ (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
TMDL .134 This decision initiated a remarkable and on-going 
effort that has the potential to create, for the first time in 
years, real and measurable water quality gains .135 For the first 
time, restoration efforts would be measured using two-year 
milestones, forcing each of the Bay jurisdictions to state, and 
then achieve, short-term and specific goals .136 Second, broad 
agreement was reached that the CBP needed to be reorga-
nized in order to focus on “implementation”137 and account-
ability, with some calling for an independent evaluator to 
improve the CBP’s credibility and ensure that on-the-ground 
progress is being made .138
By the fall of 2008, the PSC had grudgingly agreed to 
reorganize the Bay Program and, among other changes, cre-
ate an independent evaluator .139 The authors had been work-
ing with PSC support staff to develop a framework for a truly 
independent and tough auditing entity,140 and the idea was—
and continues to be—strongly supported by the Citizen 
Advisory Committee (“CAC”),141 a group that provides “a 
non-governmental perspective on the Bay cleanup effort .”142 
But John Griffin, the secretary of the Maryland Department 
of Natural Resources, who was serving a one-year term as 
PSC chair, appeared to balk at the idea of setting up a new 
office within the CBP structure . We suspect that resistance 
to the creation of a permanent independent evaluator office 
within the CBP was fueled by funding shortfalls, hypocriti-
cal concern about the creation of more “bureaucracy,” and 
conflicting anxieties about whether, on one hand, the inde-
pendent evaluator would be too tough on the states or, on 
the other, would not be tough enough . Instead, the PSC 
and, ultimately, the CBP Executive Council, was persuaded 
134 . Chesapeake Bay TMDL: Creating the TMDL, U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, 
http://www .epa .gov/reg3wapd/tmdl/ChesapeakeBay/creatingthetmdl .html 
(last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
135 . See Oliver Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I: TMDLs 
and the Chesapeake Bay, 41 ELR 10208, 10216–18 (Mar . 2011) (“Fixed 
requirements are often the bureaucrat’s best friend, their shield from un-
happy constituencies .”) .
136 . See U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, Chesapeake Bay TMDL, supra note 28, at 
ES-8; see also NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 6 (explaining 
the importance of such milestones) .
137 . David A . Farenthold, Bay Program Ready to Study Less, Work More, Wash . 
Post (Sept . 26, 2006), http://www .washingtonpost .com/wp-dyn/content/ar-
ticle/2006/09/25/AR2006092501162 .html .
138 . Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay Program Governance: Manag-
ing the Partnership for a Restored and Protected Watershed and Bay 43–44 
(Feb . 27, 2009) (unpublished governance document) [hereinafter CBP 
Governance], available at http://archive .chesapeakebay .net/pubs/calen-
dar/_03-13-09_Handout_4_10155 .pdf .
139 . Chesapeake Bay Program, Backgrounder: Chesapeake Bay Independent Evalu-
ation (Mar . 25, 2010) [hereinafter Backgrounder], available at http://www .
chesapeakebay .net/content/publications/cbp_51032 .pdf; CBP Governance, 
supra note 138, at 43 . The announcement that reorganization would occur 
first appeared in fall 2006 . See Fahrenthold, Bay Program Ready to Study More, 
supra note 137 .
140 . Indeed, Frank Dawson, representing the Maryland Department of Natural 
Resources, presented to the PSC in September 2008 and recommended that 
the “Executive Council create an Independent Evaluator within the program .” 
Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 19, at 10 .
141 . See Letter from Nikki L . Tinsley, Chair, Citizens Advisory Comm . to the Ches-
apeake Exec . Council, to Principals’ Staff Comm . (Jan . 3, 2012), available at 
http://chesapeakecac .org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/CAC-letter-to-PSC-
on-NAS-recs-Jan-2012 .pdf .
142 . Citizens Advisory Committee: Scope and Purpose, Chesapeake Bay Program, 
http://www .chesapeakebay .net/groups/group/citizens_advisory_committee 
(last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
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to support a one-time evaluation conducted by the NRC, an 
option that we argued would be expensive, take three years 
to complete (it did), and was likely to focus not on improving 
government accountability for failed restoration but rather 
on the soundness of the scientific and technical assumptions 
that underlie restoration planning .143 In November 2008, 
instead of creating an independent office, the Executive 
Council announced that the NRC would conduct an “inde-
pendent evaluation” of the CBP .144 That report was released 
in May 2011 .145
The CBP’s decision to ask the NRC for a one-time 
report, and the manner in which the NRC chose to pursue 
this work, were disappointing detours from the pursuit of 
explicit, on-going institutional accountability for the CBP 
partners .146 The Executive Council directed the NRC to 
“evaluate and provide advice on the CBP nutrient reduc-
tion program and strategy .”147 Some meaningful aspects of 
accountability are in this request—e .g ., the evaluation of 
how well states are “tracking” best management practice 
implementation—but the committee was not asked directly 
to address how independent auditors might evaluate state 
programs on-the-ground.148
The NRC panel selected to lead the effort was dominated 
by scientific experts who were chosen for their expertise in 
such highly technical fields as “the assessment of nonpoint 
source pollution on surface water quality,” “the economics of 
natural resources conservation,” “ensur[ing] that the water 
quality goals and water quantity needs of Florida’s agricul-
tural industry are achieved,” “the development and applica-
tion of mathematical and statistical models to  .  .  . sediment 
quality problems,” “anthropogenic alterations of biogeo-
chemical cycles,” “the cycling of phosphorus in soil-plant-
water systems,” and “modeling as a tool to predict movement 
of pesticides .”149 These limitations were especially unfortu-
nate given the CBP’s long-standing and inordinate preoc-
cupation with the analysis of environmental conditions from 
a highly technical perspective .150
The unsurprising result was that the NRC committee 
made findings that in many instances sidestepped the prob-
lem of holding the partners accountable for doing more than 
studying Bay environmental conditions and planning on 
paper to take steps that might reduce pollution .151 For exam-
ple, the NRC committee issued the following open-ended 
invitation to emphasize the ongoing study of environmental 
143 . See generally NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 57–58 (sum-
marizing the challenges that confront Bay restoration efforts and making rec-
ommendations to strengthen those efforts) .
144 . See CBP Governance, supra note 138 at 43–44 .
145 . Kim Walker, Scientists Question Bay Cleanup Tracking, B’More Green: An 
Environmental Blog for Everyday Living (May 4, 2011, 11:00 AM), 
http://weblogs .baltimoresun .com/features/green/2011/05/scientists_question_
bay_cleanu_1 .html .
146 . NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at vii–ix .
147 . Id. at viii .
148 . See id. at 3 .
149 . These descriptions are drawn from the biographies of NRC panel members 
listed in Appendix F of the NAS/NRC Committee Report . See id. at 243–45 .
150 . See id. at iii; see also What We Do, The Nat’l Acads ., http://nationalacademies .
org/about/whatwedo/index .html (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
151 . See NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 163–66 .
conditions and the scientific education of the citizenry, as 
opposed to the efficacy of government programs:
[s]uccess in meeting CBP goals will require careful attention 
to the consequences of future population levels, develop-
ment patterns, agricultural production systems, and chang-
ing climate dynamics in the Bay Watershed .   .   .   . Helping 
the public understand lag times and uncertainties associated 
with water quality improvements and developing program 
strategies to account for them are vital to sustaining public 
support for the program, especially if near-term Bay response 
does not meet expectations .152
Even so, some of the report’s findings bolster our conten-
tion that an independent evaluator should be established as 
soon as possible, lest the CBP and EPA repeat their error 
of failing to generate clear, relevant, and objective informa-
tion in real time about what states are actually doing to 
reduce the nutrient loading that is jeopardizing the Bay .153 
For example, the report emphasized the problems of verify-
ing the efficacy of so-called “best management practices” 
(“BMP”) that are the vehicle for unregulated, nonpoint 
sources to reduce the nutrient pollution they discharge 
into the watershed .154 BMPs include such measures as 
establishing riparian buffers for “trapping, filtering, and 
converting sediments, nutrients, and other chemicals .”155 
The NRC found that federal and state efforts to quantify 
the number of functioning BMPs across the Bay jurisdic-
tions “cannot on the whole be viewed as accurate” because 
of inconsistencies, the lack of robust field verification, and 
double counting .156 This problem is intensified because 
current tracking systems do not include practices that are 
not funded by government “cost-share” dollars .157 As a 
result, the committee “was unable to determine the reli-
ability and accuracy of the BMP data reported by the Bay 
jurisdictions .”158 It was also not able to “to quantify the 
magnitude or the likely direction of the error introduced 
by BMP reporting issues .”159
Getting a reasonable estimate of existing BMPs is one 
thing, determining the accuracy of the data reported as part 
of the BMPs is quite another—and the NRC said that it 
could not determine whether the BMP data reported by the 
states was reliable or accurate .160 The report concludes that 
“[i]ndependent (third-party) auditing of the tracking and 
152 . See id. at 163–64 .
153 . See generally Principals’ Staff Comm ., Chesapeake Bay Partner’s Response to 
the NRC’s Report 3 (Feb . 16, 2012) (unpublished presentation), available 
at http://www .chesapeakebay .net/channel_files/17880/(attachment_iii .a)_
recommendations_nas_report_2-16-2012_2 .pptx (thanking the NRC for its 
report and expressing agreement with some of its recommendations) .
154 . NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 39 .
155 . See Chesapeake Bay Program, No . CBP/TRS-282-06, Best Manage-
ment Practices for Sediment Control and Water Clarity Enhance-
ment 8–10 (2006), available at http://www .chesapeakebay .net/content/
publications/cbp_13369 .pdf .
156 . NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 4 .
157 . Id. Farmers may choose to decrease their use of expensive fertilizers regardless 
of whether governments offer them subsidies to do so .
158 . Id. at 83 .
159 . Id. at 4 .
160 . Id. at 4 .
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accounting at state and local levels would be necessary to 
ensure the reliability and accuracy of the data reported .”161
A second, scathing GAO report issued in 2011 confirmed 
that the CBP was continuing business as usual to an unfor-
tunate degree, adding urgency to continued calls for an 
independent evaluator by the CAC .162 The report said that 
federal and state agencies were often working at cross pur-
poses to each other because not all private sector stakehold-
ers are willing to acknowledge the importance, much less 
the inevitability, of the federal TMDL and are instead doing 
everything they can to undermine it .163 Just as disturbing, 
although “[t]he watershed states are critical partners in the 
effort to restore the bay,  .  .  . state officials told GAO that they 
are not working toward the [federal] goals .”164 Instead, these 
state officials, who can only be described as recalcitrant, 
claim they are confused as to which “strategy” or agreement 
to follow, as “most state bay restoration work is conducted 
according to state commitments made in a previous bay res-
toration agreement, the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement .”165
B.	 An	Independent	Evaluator:	The	Idea	Persists
Fortunately, the idea for an independent evaluator persists 
in prominent documents affecting Bay restoration . President 
Obama’s Executive Order 13,508 called for an “independent 
evaluator [to] periodically report[] to the [Federal Leadership 
Committee] on progress toward meeting the goals of this 
order .”166 A box labeled “Independent Evaluator” is included 
on the CBP’s organizational chart,167 and accompanying lit-
erature touts it as being “included as an organizational func-
tion in the new Bay Program structure .”168
Unfortunately, however, the opportunities for ongo-
ing sabotage of the idea remain plentiful . Of course, as it 
does with every large and small issue, the PSC appointed 
a subcommittee, named the “Independent Evaluator Action 
Team,” to assess its options with respect to the structure and 
substance of this function .169 In November 2011, a reveal-
ing, but author-less, document entitled “Key Challenges 
Identified by the Chesapeake Bay Program Partners from 
the NAS/NRC Report” was distributed to the group and 
made available to the public .170 The document indicates that 
three camps have emerged, each arguing for disparate out-
comes .171 The first would establish an “Office of the Inde-
161 . Id.
162 . See U .S . Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-11-802, Chesapeake Bay: 
Restoration Effort Needs Common Federal and State Goals and As-





166 . See Executive Order 13,508, 74 Fed . Reg . 23099, 23101 (May 15, 2009) .
167 . See How We’re Organized, supra note 107 .
168 . See Backgrounder, supra note 139 .
169 . The Executive Council created an “independent evaluator action team” tasked 
with helping define the scope of the charge and inform the process . See Inde-
pendent Evaluator Action Team: Scope and Purpose, Chesapeake Bay Program, 
http://www .chesapeakebay .net/groups/group/independent_evaluator_action_
team (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
170 . Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 19 .
171 . Id. at 12–14 .
pendent Evaluator” within the CBP that would retain “the 
necessary independence to fairly and accurately evaluate the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Bay Partnership’s programs 
and efforts,” and report to a “high level EPA official .”172 The 
second faction, comprised of the CAC, would establish a 
strong, “independent function” that would focus on whether 
the CBP and its partners are “doing what we report;” it 
specifically opposes the status quo, i .e., EPA acceptance of 
“BMP implementation data without verification .”173 The 
third and arguably most powerful camp is led by staff from 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia; it would create 
“non-independent internal program evaluation,” using teams 
made up of PSC members to review performance .174 Penn-
sylvania and Virginia assert that an independent evaluator or 
evaluation of any kind is no longer necessary at all because 
the PSC’s subsequent endorsement of an “adaptive manage-
ment framework” takes care of the problem .175
In February 2012, the Bay Program partners officially 
responded to the NRC’s report, presenting their conclusions 
to the PSC .176 The PSC made several decisions to address the 
NRC’s findings—from “build[ing] a partnership-wide BMP 
verification system” to tasking its committees to carry out 
the NRC’s adaptive management recommendations—but 
deferred action on the creation of an independent evalua-
tor .177 The PSC met again in mid-May 2012 without making 
a decision on this issue .178
Although population growth and climate change in the 
region have certainly made Bay restoration efforts more dif-
ficult, the critical problem with Bay restoration efforts lies 
with the underlying premise of the CBP itself: that a volun-
tary, cooperative approach among federal and state partners 
will work without genuine accountability and strong leader-
ship . The Bay Program’s collaborative, cooperative institu-
tional design—the very attribute for which it has long been 
celebrated as a model179—is the primary cause of the Bay 
Program’s lack of progress .180 We conclude that as long as the 
Bay Program lacks real authority to require its federal and 
state partners to take action, no entity is directly responsible 
for Bay cleanup—and no entity takes the blame for the man-
172 . Id. at 12 .
173 . Id. at 14 .
174 . Id. at 13 .
175 . Id. at 14 .
176 . Principals’ Staff Comm ., Chesapeake Bay Partners’ Response, supra note 153 .
177 . Minutes from Chesapeake Bay Program Principals’ Staff Comm . Meeting, su-
pra note 22 .
178 . Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay Program Update: Management 
Board Meeting 6 (May 9, 2012) (unpublished meeting agenda), available 
at http://www .chesapeakebay .net/channel_files/18082/(attachment_i .b)_
program_update .pdf .
179 . See, e.g., Robert W . Adler et al ., Lessons From Large Watershed Pro-
grams 83 (2000) (exploring the challenges that confront large-scale, multi-
jurisdictional programs to restore water quality in sprawling watersheds); Jon 
Cannon, Checking in on the Chesapeake: Some Questions of Design, 40 U . Rich . 
L . Rev . 1131, 1131 (2006) [hereinafter Checking in on the Chesapeake] (con-
sidering potential changes to the Bay program’s institutional design); Mark 
Imperial et al ., An Evolutionary Perspective on the Development and Assessment of 
the National Estuary Program, 20 Coastal Mgmt . 311, 324 (1992) (conclud-
ing the CBP’s success makes it a model for other watershed collaborations) . 
180 . See Checking in on the Chesapeake, supra note 179 (offering a different perspec-
tive) . Jon Cannon concludes that, despite its failures, restructuring the Bay 
Program is not in order . Id. at 1131 .
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ifest failure . Accordingly, the Bay Program must shift away 
from the current supportive environment that avoids target-
ing responsibility—without sacrificing the cooperation that 
is essential to its success and survival—and overhaul how the 
Program holds itself and its state partners accountable .
III. The Independent Evaluator: Mission, 
Characteristics, and Resistance
A.	 Mission
With a restoration price tag in the billions of dollars, a bad 
economy that has yet to emerge from an unprecedented global 
tailspin, and strong public aversion to higher taxes and the 
government programs they support, the idea of creating yet 
another group of bureaucrats to monitor progress in restor-
ing the Chesapeake Bay may seem like a fool’s errand .181 Our 
critique of the alphabet soup of committees, subcommittees, 
working groups, and taskforces should have convinced us, 
the reader may well be thinking, that checking on the check-
ers is unlikely to overcome the powerful forces invested in 
business as usual—in this case, the full employment for hun-
dreds of career bureaucrats who are deeply entrenched in the 
status quo of taking one step forward and two steps back .
We persist for one simple reason: the only administra-
tive methodology that remains rare in the Chesapeake Bay 
watershed is a prominent, well-respected, objective entity 
willing to expose grand plans that are not working .182 In 
the exceptional cases when such voices have emerged—most 
notably, when GAO issued the withering 2005 report that 
created the conditions that compelled EPA to promulgate 
the Bay TMDL—they have proved remarkably effective .183 
The existing program’s stalwart embrace of complexity, to 
the point that unraveling what is really happening on the 
ground is virtually impossible, is the best reason why the 
institutional equivalent of the boy who told the emperor he 
had no clothes is essential .184 Nationally respected auditors 
such as GAO and the NRC can help periodically with the 
evaluation of the intrinsically inconsistent paper promises 
made by federal and state officials or the scientific and tech-
nical challenges that stymy them .185 Only an organization 
embedded in the daily operations of restoration, however, 
will be able to dig deep enough to consistently establish 
accountability . The independent evaluator’s mission must 
be to promote accountability by continually diagnosing the 
specific problems that prevent the CBP and its partners from 
achieving Bay restoration goals and then allocating respon-
sibility for why these problems are not being addressed . Put 
181 . Jeff Hager, Effort to Save Chesapeake Bay Carries Costs, ABC2 News (July 
10, 2012), http://www .abc2news .com/dpp/news/region/baltimore_county/
effort-to-save-chesapeake-bay-carries-costs (presenting a farmer’s view of in-
creased regulations) .
182 . See, e.g., GAO, Recent Actions, supra note 4, at 9 (discussing the 2005 GAO 
report which indicated numerous problems with the management of the resto-
ration progress) .
183 . See id.
184 . See supra pp . 58–60 .
185 . See GAO, Chesapeake Bay: Restoration Effort, supra note 162, at High-
lights; NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 49 .
more directly, the independent evaluator’s mission is institu-
tional accountability, namely, assessing whether promised or 
required federal and state actions are in fact happening and, 
if not, why not .
B. Characteristics
The independent evaluator should have three essential, 
closely related characteristics: (1) independence and neutral-
ity; (2) work guided by a short list of evolving metrics; and 
(3) a problem-solving orientation . The actual and, as impor-
tant, perceived authority to set its own agenda without inter-
ference by EPA or the Bay states is the irreducible quid pro 
quo for this approach to succeed . The independent evaluator 
should be a free-standing entity, run by a relatively senior 
person with impeccable reputation, who reports directly to 
the Chesapeake Bay Program Executive Council .186 At all 
stages of its development, the independent evaluator should 
remain independent of existing chains of command, espe-
cially the PSC, the group of senior federal and state officials 
who advise the CBP Executive Council and who are heavily 
invested in the status quo .187
To structure its work, the independent evaluator should 
develop a discrete set of no more than two dozen metrics that 
measure the most important aspects of federal and state per-
formance in implementing the Bay TMDL .188 For example:
• For each sector, is the state’s NPDES permitting pro-
gram effective at issuing up-to-date permits for all 
facilities that require them? Specifically, what percent-
age of NPDES permits are up-to-date?
• When will the state have all permits updated and 
rewritten to include the Bay-wide TMDL and indi-
vidual tributary segment TMDLs?
• What are the total number of violations, the number 
of civil and administrative penalty actions, and the 
amount of civil and administrative penalties collected 
in the relevant watersheds during the last year?189
186 . Chesapeake Executive Council: Scope and Purpose, Chesapeake Bay Program, 
http://www .chesapeakebay .net/groups/group/chesapeake_executive_council 
(last visited Dec . 16, 2012) (“The Chesapeake Executive Council was estab-
lished by the Chesapeake Bay Agreement of 1983 . Under the 1987 Chesapeake 
Bay Agreement, membership changed from cabinet secretaries to the governors 
of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia; the administrator of the U .S . Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency; the mayor of the District of Columbia; and the 
chair of the Chesapeake Bay Commission, a legislative body serving Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia .”) .
187 . Principals’ Staff Committee: Scope and Purpose, supra note 105 (“The Principals’ 
Staff Committee (PSC) acts as the policy advisors to the Executive Council, 
accepting items for Council consideration and approval, and setting agendas 
for Council meetings . Individual members of the PSC arrange and provide 
briefings to their principals, the Agreement signatories . The PSC also provides 
policy and program direction to the Implementation Committee .”) .
188 . See generally Rena Steinzor & Sidney Shapiro, The People’s Agents and 
the Battle to Protect the American Public: Special Interests, Gov-
ernment, and Threats to Health, Safety, and the Environment 173–91 
(2010) (discussing why indicators, or metrics, are important to government 
accountability) .
189 . See William L . Andreen et al ., Ctr . for Progressive Reform, Ensuring 
Accountability in Chesapeake Bay Restoration: Metrics for the Phase 
I Watershed Implementation Plans 3–9 (2010), available at http://www .
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Because EPA has threatened serious consequences for 
states that do not meet their interim “milestones,” the states 
routinely claim in their Watershed Implementation Plans 
(“WIP”) that they are on schedule to meet TMDL targets .190 
Those plans do not disclose, however, how fast the states 
will rewrite permits to reduce point source discharges down 
to acceptable levels, making it very difficult to judge those 
claims .191 Metrics such as the above would reveal whether or 
not the states are on schedule to meet their TMDL targets .
Last but not least, the independent evaluator’s reports 
on federal and state government compliance with the 
TMDL should include potential solutions to address 
shortfalls in the states’ performance . If funding is inad-
equate to achieve the relevant goals, the reports should say 
how much is needed and how it might be raised . If the 
poor performance of state agencies or regulated industries’ 
recalcitrance is a problem, the reports should acknowledge 
those unpleasant realities .
1.	 Neutrality	and	Independence
As we have noted, state government officials who participate 
in the CBP first must ensure that their own state’s interests 
are protected . The results are strategies that are defensive 
rather than proactive, ultimately driven by the concern that 
the CBP might endorse actions that would cast the state in 
a negative light or cost too much .192 Not surprisingly, the 
chair of the Chesapeake Bay Commission, who sits on the 
CBP Executive Council, rotates,193 and the CBP Executive 
Council elects its Chair from a different state or agency every 
few years, lest any particular state be able to use the posi-
tion to impose its own policy initiatives .194 Yet for all these 
precautions, the Council is primarily a ceremonial body .195 
The real work of opposing disadvantageous initiatives and 
progressivereform .org/articles/CPR_Chesapeake_Metrics .pdf (providing more 
examples of possible metrics) .
190 . E.g., Md . Dept . of the Env’t . et al ., Maryland’s Phase II Watershed Im-
plementation Plan for the Chesapeake Bay TMDL 11 (2012), available 
at http://www .mde .state .md .us/programs/Water/TMDL/TMDLImplementa-
tion/Documents/FINAL_PhaseII_Report_Docs/Final_Documents_PhaseII/
Final_Phase_II_WIP_MAIN_REPORT_102612 .pdf (stating that it “is pro-
jected” that the state will meet EPA’s expectations for 2017); see Chesapeake Bay 
TMDL: How Does it Work? Ensuring Results, U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, http://
www .epa .gov/reg3wapd/tmdl/ChesapeakeBay/EnsuringResults .html (last visit-
ed Dec . 16, 2012) (providing links to each of the First Phase WIPs submitted 
by the states to EPA in December 2010) .
191 . E.g., Md . Dept . of the Env’t, supra note 190, at 10, 14–15, 76–77, 81 (stat-
ing plans for reductions from point sources for 2017 without stating how fast 
they will rewrite permits for point sources to achieve reductions) .
192 . See id.
193 . Chesapeake Executive Council: Scope and Purpose, supra note 186; What Is the 
Chesapeake Bay Commission?, Chesapeake Bay Program (Jan . 28, 2011), http://
www .chesapeakebay .net/blog/post/what_is_the_chesapeake_bay_commission .
194 . Press Release, Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Executive Council Elects 
New Chair, Announces Local Government Award Recipients and Discusses 
Progress Toward Healthy Waters (July 9, 2012), available at http://www .
chesapeakebay .net/presscenter/release/chesapeake_executive_council_elects_
new_chair_announces_local_government_aw; Press Release, Chesapeake Bay 
Program, EPA Administrator Lisa P . Jackson Becomes Chair of Chesapeake 
Executive Council (Jan . 5, 2010), available at http://www .chesapeakebay .net/
presscenter/release/epa_administrator_lisa_p ._jackson_becomes_chair_of_
chesapeake_executive_cou .
195 . See infra notes 55–65 and accompanying text .
poking holes in rival states’ claims of glory is done within 
the PSC .196
In approaching this difficult playing field with such 
unabashed cynicism, we hasten to acknowledge that the 
CBP’s efforts have advanced the cause of Bay restoration, 
although not nearly as quickly or effectively as the Bay part-
ners themselves promised .197 As we said at the outset, the 
Chesapeake Bay’s environmental conditions are exception-
ally well understood .198 It may be that Federal money for 
such research on that subject was consumed rapidly by the 
CBP because it was a far more acceptable way to channel the 
work of its committees and subcommittees than the formu-
lation of more stringent pollution controls . Now that EPA is 
making its best efforts to force the PSC off this safe island of 
relatively benign investigative activity and into the arena of 
making hard and expensive choices, the time is ripe for the 
introduction of an auditor capable of making credible pro-
nouncements that progress has—or, even more important, 
has not—been made .199
The individual who heads the office of the indepen-
dent evaluator, as well as the professional staff he or she 
leads, must not only be capable of behaving with dispas-
sion, but also be perceived as dispassionate in judging 
the performance of the Bay states and EPA . He or she 
must not owe—nor be perceived as owing—any loyalty 
to the private sector constituencies that have infiltrated 
the CBP’s extensive bureaucratic infrastructure—from 
sewage treatment plant operators, to farmers, to environ-
mental groups .200 Finding people with these characteris-
tics is far easier said than done, and could prove almost 
impossible if expertise is considered the most important 
criterion in recruitment .
In the context of the Chesapeake Bay and the disap-
pointing history of efforts to restore it,201 appointing an 
independent evaluator with Bay-specific expertise could 
undermine actual and perceived neutrality . Virtually any-
one who can claim an extensive scientific, technical, legal, 
or administrative background in the work of the CBP 
may be perceived by other participants as having an axe 
to grind . Even reputable scholars at local academic institu-
tions are not immune from these suspicions, in no small 
measure because they depend on the CBP’s largesse for 
grant funding, and therefore have a vested stake in sing-
196 . See infra notes 55–65 and accompanying text .
197 . U .S . Geological Survey, U .S . Dep’t of the Interior, FS–125–01,The U .S . 
Geological Survey Chesapeake Bay Science Program 2 (2001), available 
at http://pubs .usgs .gov/fs/fs125-01/fs125-01 .pdf .
198 . See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Program, 2004 Chesapeake Bay Oyster Manage-
ment Plan (2005) (recognizing ecological impacts resulting in reduced his-
toric oyster populations and the need to restore the oyster population), avail-
able at http://www .chesapeakebay .net/content/publications/cbp_12889 .pdf; 
see also J . Court Stevenson, Catherine B . Piper & Nedra Confer, U .S . 
Fish & Wildlife Serv ., Decline of Submerged Plants in Chesapeake Bay 
(1979), available at http://www .fws .gov/chesapeakebay/savpage .htm (high-
lighting the decline in Bay-wide aquatic grass beds) .
199 . See Letter from Shawn M . Garvin, Reg’l Adm’r, U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, to 
Principals’ Staff Comm . Members (Jun . 11, 2010), available at http://www .
epa .gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/TMDLScheduleLetter .pdf .
200 . GAO, Recent Actions, supra note 4, at 13 (highlighting the CBP’s lack of 
independent and creditable mechanisms) .
201 . Id.
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ing its praises .202 Precisely because such an unusually large, 
diverse, and entrenched professional class of experts is in 
existence and has ossified into familiar patterns of deflect-
ing problems and justifying inactivity, choosing an inde-
pendent evaluator principal or staff from that cadre could 
easily undermine the office from the start .
Instead, the priority should be to hire people with inves-
tigative expertise . Predicting the water quality impact of 
applying chicken manure to frozen ground may be impor-
tant to Bay restoration, as is analyzing the efficacy of cer-
tain cover crops in trapping nutrients before they wash into 
tributaries,203 but such experts are already active in the 
CBP .204 The value added by an independent evaluator is 
the ability to check whether winter application is in fact 
happening or whether cover crops have actually gone into 
the ground .205
The ideal candidate for independent evaluator would 
be a senior law enforcement official with experience under 
fire, or rather, who has policed a contentious and complex 
industry or geographical area . We suggest this profile not 
because we are recommending that the independent evalu-
ator be granted enforcement powers by Congress . Rather, 
we think that the prosecution of civil and criminal viola-
tors should continue to reside with federal and state regula-
tors . Nevertheless, investigative experience would equip the 
independent evaluator to navigate the complicated opera-
tions of the CBP, searching for indicators of whether resto-
ration is going well or poorly .
The independent evaluator should have sufficient 
resources to hire a staff of similarly qualified investigators, 
including experts in crucial support specialties such as data 
analysis and computing . Because much of the office’s work 
will involve field inspections throughout the watershed, the 
staff should be skilled in conducting witness interviews and 
recovering documents .
Because the independent evaluator will be a new entity 
operating without federal or state statutory authority, the 
office could encounter serious problems if owners and 
operators of facilities that contribute pollution to the Bay 
resist its investigative efforts . One solution to this problem 
would be for EPA and Bay state governors to condition 
the receipt of federal and state funding on cooperation 
with those investigations . A second approach would be for 
the independent evaluator to request assistance in cases 
involving recalcitrant targets from the relevant federal 
and state regulatory agencies . Should Congress recover 
from its existing state of gridlock and prepare to consider 
overdue legislation to reauthorize the CBP, the indepen-
dent evaluator should be given all of the powers to inves-
202 . Grants & RFPs, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www .chesapeakebay .net/
rfps (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) (listing grant opportunities from the CBP) .
203 . See Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay Program Strategic Implementa-
tion Plan: Restoring Healthy Waters 1–5 (July 24, 2007) (unpublished draft 
report), available at http://archive .chesapeakebay .net/pubs/calendar/TSC_09-
12-07_Handout_9_7940 .pdf .
204 . Id.
205 . See infra pp . 59–60 (discussing the importance of on-the-ground investigation 
and fact checking) .
tigate that it needs, including the authority to issue access 
orders and subpoenas .206
The office should report directly to the CBP Executive 
Council, which should retain exclusive authority to hire or 
fire its director, as opposed to delegating the function to the 
PSC . The one drawback of the Executive Council is that it 
does not include all the Bay states, omitting new members 
New York, Delaware, and West Virginia .207 It is by far the 
best choice, however, for political and practical reasons . 
Conferring this supervisory authority on EPA would inspire 
needless and draining opposition by recalcitrant states, while 
handing it to the PSC would ensure that the independent 
evaluator’s status is reduced to the level of that body’s other 
committees, taskforces, and working groups . A neutral bro-
ker is needed .
2.	 Metrics
At the threshold, the independent evaluator will only suc-
ceed by establishing criteria—or, more accurately, “met-
rics”—for judging federal and state advancement toward the 
overall goal of restoring the Bay . CBP has made enormous 
progress in defining and measuring progress in the context 
of ambient environmental conditions in the Bay and has 
established numerical goals for reducing various types of 
pollution within a set period of time . But creating account-
ability needs a different kind of metric, or measurement, of 
progress . To succeed, any oversight must go one crucial step 
beyond defining environmental conditions to the point of 
identifying what actions are needed to improve those condi-
tions and which entities will be held responsible for under-
taking that work .
At the same time, because sorting through the volume 
of information generated and disseminated on a daily basis 
is, for most of us, a never-ending task, the metrics must be 
pointed and concise if they are going to effectively resonate 
with policymakers and the public . Professor Wendy Wagner 
has coined the phrase “filter failure” to describe the prob-
lem of information overload that is pervasive in regulatory 
affairs .208 She explains that the cramming of rulemaking 
records by private sector contractors leads in turn to “infor-
mation capture .” 209 This phenomenon dramatically strength-
ens the influence of special interest groups who can afford to 
generate endless, redundant, and marginally relevant reams 
of data—leaving civil servants, public interest groups, and 
the public itself in the proverbial dust when decisions must 
206 . See Chesapeake Bay Found ., Chesapeake Clean Water Act Blocked in U.S. Sen-
ate, Bay Daily (Dec . 21, 2010, 5:10 PM), http://cbf .typepad .com/bay_dai-
ly/2010/12/senate-majority-leader-harry-reid-has-abandoned-plans-to-bring-
to-the-floor-an-omnibus-bill-designed-to-protect-wilderness-ar .html (describ-
ing the challenges such legislation would face) .
207 . See Chesapeake Executive Council: Scope and Purpose, supra note 186 (listing 
only the governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia and the District of 
Columbia, the Administrator of EPA, and the chair of Chesapeake Bay Com-
mission as Executive Council members) .
208 . Wendy E . Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 
59 Duke L .J . 1321, 1328 (2010) .
209 . “In the regulatory context, information capture refers to the excessive use of 
information and related information costs as a means of gaining control over 
regulatory decisionmaking in informal rulemakings .” Id. at 1325 . 
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be made .210 Wagner says that the “root cause” of informa-
tion capture “is not administrative law’s commitment to 
open government and transparency, but rather its failure to 
require participants to self-process the information they load 
into the system .”211
Filter failure and information capture run rampant in the 
CBP . The major culprits are not private sector special interest 
groups hoping to derail or delay rulemaking, but rather fed-
eral and state government employees who write voluminous 
documents describing every initiative they design to make 
progress on Bay restoration .212 The CBP is quite proud of its 
ChesapeakeStat website, launched in 2010 “to increase gov-
ernment accountability and improve coordination of restora-
tion actions by providing information on partner activities, 
funding, and progress towards goals .”213 The site contains a 
wealth of information regarding conditions in the Bay—e .g ., 
the percentage of land covered by impervious surfaces such 
as parking lots that produce polluted run-off—and even 
allows readers to make their own maps by overlaying data 
about those conditions on top of one another .214 It does not, 
however present any form of auditing information about an 
individual state’s actual performance in permitting, inspect-
ing, or enforcing the law with respect to individual sources, 
whether regulated or not .215 To mangle a popular adage, 
nitrogen does not pollute the Bay; parking lots in Maryland, 
concentrated animal feeding operations in Virginia, and 
sewage treatment plants in Pennsylvania do .216
As for EPA’s efforts to track state progress in implement-
ing the TMDL, the Agency appears allergic to creating tem-
plates, inventing standardized forms, or in any other way 
asking the states to provide information that can be com-
pared easily by anyone other than the experts themselves .217 
This omission, which also wastes EPA’s resources, is espe-
cially egregious with respect to important documents, such 
as WIPs, which supposedly explain, in a way cognizable by 
210 . “To make matters worse, as the issues grow more numerous and technical, 
less well-financed interest groups find it hard to continue participating in the 
process . They often lack the time, the resources, or the expertise to continue 
reviewing all of the information that becomes part of the rulemaking record . 
Yet as their engagement wanes, so does the pluralistic engine considered so fun-
damental to the administrative process . They can no longer provide a means 
of culling out extraneous information and other chaff from the rulemaking 
through their vigorous engagement . Incentives to load as much information as 
possible into the system, combined with a reduction in the number and diver-
sity of affected parties participating in the rulemaking process, set the stage for 
information capture .” Id. (citations omitted) .
211 . Id.
212 . See Wiersema, supra note 81, at 1277–80; Steinzor & Jones, An Accountability 
Mechanism, supra note 40, at 6 .
213 . About ChesapeakeStat, ChesapeakeStat, http://stat .chesapeakebay .net/?q=
node/5 (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
214 . See Water Quality: Agriculture, ChesapeakeStat, http://stat .chesapeakebay .net/?
q=node/130&quicktabs_10=1&quicktabs_15=7 (last visited Dec . 16, 2012) .
215 . See id.
216 . Cf. James Bacon, Fast Draw Clubs Grow, The Hutchinson News, May 31, 
1959, at 6 (“Guns don’t kill people . People kill people .”) .
217 . See TMDL Implementation and Tracking, U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, http://
water .epa .gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/implement .cfm (last updated 
Mar . 6, 2012) (“Because there are often numerous control practices involved in 
a single TMDL’s implementation, it would be particularly complex and expen-
sive for states or EPA to track all implementation actions under all TMDLs . 
Moreover, whereas EPA oversees and approves TMDL development by states, 
the Agency does not have authority over their implementation .”) .
citizens, what the states will do to meet new TMDL pollu-
tion limits .218 In a report card focusing on the first round 
of WIPs, the Center for Progressive Reform recommended 
changes in the required disclosures for WIPs so that the 
states’ progress in meeting TMDLs could be verified .219 
Those recommendations have yet to bear fruit .
These deeply engrained and exceptionally bad habits 
underscore the need for an independent evaluator to struc-
ture its work by adopting a small but meaningful set of indi-
cators—or accountability metrics—that are digestible by 
public interest groups, the public at large, and the media . 
The focus of these metrics should be institutional progress 
toward the overall goal of restoring the Bay, as opposed to 
data that describes environmental conditions in the Bay . 
So, rather than reporting the blue crab population through-
out the Bay, accountability metrics would disclose whether 
(1) all concentrated animal feeding operations have updated 
permits; (2) such facilities were inspected by a state official; 
(3) violations were found; and (4) the state took steps to com-
pel the facility to correct these problems . In other words, 
accountability metrics should focus on the actual implemen-
tation of state plans in an effort to measure the extent to 
which the CBP and its partners’ efforts result in improved 
environmental quality .
The design of an accountability metrics program should 
be informed by the following five criteria:
• Short and Concise. Elaborate metrics involving mul-
tiple vague, qualitative measures have limited utility .
• Worst, First. Metrics should be prioritized to allow the 
Program and its partners to focus on the most impor-
tant problems .
• Information Forcing . Metrics should not depend—or 
be circumscribed by—the availability of information 
needed to determine if they are met . If metrics were 
designed based only on whether information is avail-
able, they would not provide federal and state partners 
with any incentive to produce new information that 
might be important to Bay restoration .
• Continuous Evolution. Metrics should be changed 
as often as possible to reflect progress and spur further 
advances .
218 . Compare Commonwealth of Va ., Chesapeake Bay TMDL Phase II Water-
shed Implementation Plan (2012), available at http://www .dcr .virginia .gov/
vabaytmdl/documents/baytmdlp2wip .pdf (explaining how Virginia intends to 
comply with the numerical limits established by the Baywide TMDL), with Md . 
Dept . of the Env’t et al ., Maryland’s Phase II Watershed Implementa-
tion Plan for the Chesapeake Bay TMDL (2012) available at http://www .
mde .state .md .us/programs/Water/TMDL/TMDLImplementation/Pages/FI-
NAL_PhaseII_WIPDocument_Main .aspx (explaining how Maryland plans to 
comply with the numerical limits established by the Baywide TMDL), and Pa . 
Dept . of Envtl . Prot ., Pennsylvania Chesapeake Watershed Implemen-
tation Plan Phase 2 (2012) (explaining how Pennsylvania intends to comply 
with the numerical limits established by the Baywide TMDL), available at http://
www .epa .gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/PhaseIIWIPS/PAFINALPhase2 
WIP3-30-2012 .pdf .
219 . See generally Andreen et al ., supra note 189, at 11–14 (proposing reforms of 
the CWA to make it more effective in protecting the environment) .
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• Diagnostic. Metrics should have the potential to help 
diagnose the causes of institutional and regulatory 
dysfunction—including funding gaps, technical com-
plexity, failures of political will, inadequate statutory 
design, and agency capture .220
3.	 Solutions
Beyond developing core metrics and updating them to keep 
pace with new developments, the independent evaluator’s 
most important function will be to verify federal and state 
planning documents by conducting spot-check inspections 
of what government officials have actually accomplished . 
Ideally, these progress reports will not simply issue a fail-
ing or a passing grade, but will suggest solutions .221 This 
approach is especially important when control over rem-
edying the poor or non-existent performance is vested in 
another branch of government .
For example, states have labored under severe economic 
constraints since the 2008 market crash that caused the 
ongoing recession, and governors have either cut or failed 
to increase the budgets for state environmental agencies .222 
To leverage the negative political implications of neglecting 
the Chesapeake Bay—especially in places like Maryland 
and Virginia where its ongoing environmental vitality is of 
crucial importance to the local economy—the independent 
evaluator’s conclusion that budget shortfalls are causing the 
states to fall behind in meeting their TMDL targets could 
prove quite helpful .223 Useful suggestions on revenue-raising 
measures could help not only to get the governor’s attention, 
but also to recruit additional allies in the state legislature .224
C.	 Arguments	Against
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia oppose creat-
ing an independent evaluator based on the assumption that 
adaptive management will fulfill the same purpose, allowing 
the Program to accomplish several program evaluations .225 
Perhaps more to the point, “[w]ith reductions in federal and 
state funds, it is imperative that federal funds be directed 
to assisting the jurisdictions in meeting the required TMDL 
reductions and not be diverted to programs which do not 
have a direct effect on ground water quality improvement .”226 
Adaptive management is a much-discussed and popular con-
220 . See generally GAO, Recent Actions, supra note 4, at 13 (exposing some of 
these issues in the current CBP structure) .
221 . See generally Andreen et al ., supra note 189, at 11–14 (issuing grades and 
suggestions) .
222 . See, e.g., Dep’t of Budget & Mgmt ., Maryland Budget Highlights: FY 
2011, at 44–45 (2011), available at http://www .dbm .maryland .gov/agencies/
operbudget/Documents/2011/FY2011BudgetHighlights .pdf (disclosing the 
Governor’s allocations for state agencies) .
223 . See Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 19, at 7–14 (offering recommenda-
tions to improve adaptive management and identifying budget issues) .
224 . Valiant Corley, County’s Crisis Letter Gets Governor’s Attention, Curry Coastal 
Pilot (Mar . 16, 2012, 9:49 PM), http://www .currypilot .com/News/Local-
News/Countys-crisis-letter-gets-governors-attention (discussing how a citizen 
group proposed revenue raising options to forestall cutting services, thereby 
gaining the governor’s attention) .
225 . See Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 19, at 13–14 .
226 . Id. at 14.
cept in environmental law and public administration .227 The 
term refers to the idea that programs designed to preserve 
natural resources should be designed with enough flexibility 
to respond to changes in the natural world .228 As one group 
of natural resource scholars has described it:
The concept of adaptive natural resource management was 
developed in the 1970s by ecologist C .S . “Buzz” Holling and 
fisheries biologist Carl Walters . They argued that limited 
knowledge about natural systems called for a structured, 
iterative approach to environmental management . The 
goal of this approach was to reduce uncertainty over time 
by systematically incorporating learning into management . 
They called for managers to design their actions as scientific 
experiments, monitoring the outcomes, and adjust manage-
ment direction in light of what the experiments revealed .229
Adaptive management programs must include:
[E]xplicitly stated goals and measureable indicators of prog-
ress toward those goals; an iterative approach to decision-
making, providing the opportunity to adjust decisions in 
light of subsequent learning; systematic monitoring of out-
comes and impacts; feedback loops so that monitoring and 
assessment produce continuous and systematic learning that 
in turn is incorporated into subsequent rounds of decision-
making; explicit acknowledgment and characterization of 
risks and uncertainties   .   .   .  ; [and] an overarching goal to 
reduce uncertainty over time .230
Of course, nothing on the face of generally accepted 
concepts of adaptive management conflicts with the insti-
tutional design of the independent evaluator we have pro-
posed . In fact, the independent evaluator could provide 
significant benefits to adaptive management, especially 
given the strong possibility that, without constant pressure, 
the Bay states will fall back into their old patterns of much 
talk and little action .
The demand to conduct independent evaluation has very 
little to do with the hope that at some future point, adaptive 
management will work well in the region . Adaptive man-
agement in the Chesapeake Bay may be a goal that some 
CBP participants have embraced in the expectation that it 
will allow them to make necessary pollution reductions in 
a “flexible” manner, which could mean more responsive and 
cost-effective reactions to environmental needs, or it could 
mean less timely and less expensive reactions .231 But this 
approach is far from being implemented .
The NRC committee reported that “although many of 
the CBP partners think they are implementing adaptive 
management,” in fact there was no evidence that “any for-
227 . Holly Doremus et al ., Making Good Use of Adaptive Management 1 (Ctr . for 
Progressive Reform, White Paper No . 1104, Apr . 2011), available at http://
www .progressivereform .org/articles/Adaptive_Management_1104 .pdf .
228 . Id. at 2 .
229 . Id.
230 . Id.; see also Rena Steinzor et al ., Getting Serious About Saving the Chesapeake 
Bay, 25 The Abell Rep ., No . 1, 2012, at 1–2 (“After decades of broken prom-
ises, the EPA and the other Bay states now say they’re serious about cleaning 
up the Bay . The key will be holding them accountable .”) .
231 . See Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 19, at 13–14 .
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mal adaptive management efforts for nutrient and sedi-
ment reduction” are in place .232 The committee also noted 
that although “some WIPs refer to uncertainties about 
funding, effectiveness of specific management practices, 
incompatible datasets, future land-use changes, and the 
quality of the EPA’s models,” the states do not explain 
“whether, or how,” they would deal with these uncertain-
ties through adaptive management .233
However mistaken the three states’ resistance to the cre-
ation of an independent evaluator may seem on the merits, 
the political dynamics in the region are sufficiently troubled 
that the idea is unlikely to be implemented unless EPA, other 
states, and citizen and environmental advocates put consid-
erable pressure on the CBP to act .234
IV. Conclusion
At the same time that EPA has stepped forward to lead the 
Bay restoration effort, moving the states back into a sys-
tem of regulatory compulsion,235 the nation is experienc-
232 . NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 108 .
233 . Id. at 110 .
234 . See generally Steinzor et al ., Getting Serious, supra note 230, at 3–4 (stating that 
states have the ability to adopt more stringent standards and programs to help 
the Bay, but “political considerations in each state make that unlikely”) .
235 . Chesapeake Bay TMDL: Creating the TMDL, supra note 134 .
ing a well-financed campaign to provoke an overwhelming 
backlash against such requirements .236 The danger is that 
non-specific claims about the evils of regulation will give 
recalcitrant state governments and potentially regulated 
industries the excuses they need to relapse into coopera-
tive inaction, leaving the Chesapeake Bay and the nation’s 
other great waters to degenerate slowly but irrevocably into 
ecological ruin . This outcome would be particularly tragic 
because the severe transboundary pollution problems that 
plague the Bay will never be solved if state governments are 
left to their own devices .237
Transitioning from collaboration that primarily benefits 
environmental professionals to a system where governments 
are held accountable for inaction seems almost impossible in 
this polarized environment .238 The alternative, however, is 
even more unthinkable . Compared to the billions spent on 
restoration in the past three decades, the independent evalua-
tor is a modest proposal, easy to set up and administer . All it 
will take is the determination to truly reform the CBP’s prefer-
ence for cooperation that asks little and delivers even less .239
236 . Elana Schor & Sarah Abruzzese, Tea Party’s Congressional Allies Diverge on 
How to Gut EPA, N .Y . Times (Feb . 10, 2011), http://www .nytimes .com/
gwire/2011/02/10/10greenwire-tea-partys-congressional-allies-diverge-on-
how-6387 .html .
237 . See generally Andreen et al ., supra note 189, at 11–14 (giving current efforts 
a failing grade) .
238 . Schor & Abruzzese, supra note 236 (“[T]ea party leaders are still working to 
align their ambitious rhetoric with direct actions to rein in U .S . EPA .”) .
239 . See generally Andreen et al ., supra note 189, at 11–14 (evaluating the quality 
of the first phase of state watershed implementation plans) .
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